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Abstract
Is there a way of eliminating human smuggling? We set up a
model to simultaneously determine the provision of human smuggling
services and the demand from would-be migrants. A visa-selling pol-
icy may be successful at eliminating smugglers by eroding their prots
but it also increases immigration. In contrast, repression decreases mi-
gration but fuels cartelized smugglers. To overcome this trade-o¤ we
show that legalisation through selling visas in combination with re-
pression can be used to eliminate human smuggling while controlling
migration ows. Simulations of the policy highlight the complemen-
tarities between repression and selling visas and call into question
current policies.
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1 Introduction
Crossing borders illegally entails very high nancial costs. This is particu-
larly true for long distance migration, which is di¢ cult to undertake without
the help of smugglers. For example, trans-pacic crossings of Chinese immi-
grants into the United States cost above $35,000 in the mid 90s and these
costs have since increased sharply.1 This makes human smuggling a lucrative
business. As of 2003, it earned smugglers over e4 billion in the EU and $5
billion revenues a year in the US (Padgett, 2003).2 Over the years, human
smuggling has merged with other types of illegal transnational activities such
as drug shipping and prostitution.3 Led by international criminal organiza-
tions these activities pose a threat to the rule of law in countries of origin,
transit, and destination. Although it is important for policy makers to un-
derstand why such illegal activities and their associated criminalities are so
prevalent, there are surprisingly very few studies on the supply side of illegal
migration (noticeable exceptions are Friebel and Guriev, 2006 and Tamura,
2010, 2013). Our paper contributes to this new literature, rst, by studying
the industrial organization of human smuggling, notably smugglerspricing
and supply of services. Second, by exploring what type of economic policies
can be implemented to ght against human smuggling.
Current migration policies, which combine quotas on visas with repression
1On smugglers fees paid by Chinese migrants in the 1990s see Friebel and Guriev,
2006. On fees paid in 2010 see the website: http://www.havocscope.com/black-market-
prices/human-smuggling-fees/ which also gives references to its sources of information. In
addition, human smuggling entails important human costs. Each year, an estimated 2,000
people are drowned in the Mediterranean on their journey from Africa to Europe (The
Economist, August 06, 2005) and many more on other routes.
2The annual associated ows of smuggled immigrants are estimated to be at around
800,000 in the EU and 350,000 in the US (The Economist 6 August 2005). These estimates
should be dealt with caution as reliable data on such activity are di¢ cult to obtain.
3Tra¢ cking victims coming from 127 countries have been found in 137 countries around
the world. It is estimated that there are at least 2.4 million persons who are the victims
of tra¢ cking at any time. Approximately 79% of these victims are tra¢ cked for sexual
exploitation and 18% for forced labour. They generate an estimated prot of over US$30
billion every year (UNODC 2012).
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of illegal migration, are very ine¤ective against smugglers.4 In fact, strong
restrictions on labour mobility imply that many candidates are obliged to
arrange long distance migration with the help of intermediaries who organ-
ise air, sea or ground transportation and provide them with forged docu-
ments, clothes, food and accommodation during the trip. Since repressive
policies are ine¤ective, this paper proposes legalisation to eradicate the il-
legal migration business. We analyse how the sale of visas, combined with
various repressive measures, can be used to eliminate smugglers while achiev-
ing pre-dened migration ow targets. We do not discuss the optimality of
such targets, nor the restrictive migration policies adopted by most advanced
economies or their lax enforcement (for an analysis of such issues see Facchini
and Testa, 2011).
Our analysis shows that the sale of visas at smugglersprice, or higher, will
not be su¢ cient to eliminate smugglers, nor to improve the skill composition
of migrants. Indeed prohibition creates a barrier to entry into the market.
Maa organisations rely on this legal barrier, and on violence, to cartelize the
industry and to charge high prices. The big markups imply that smugglers
will respond to the sale of visas by lowering the price they propose and still
make a prot. This will hence increase migration ows. We may also expect
the high prices charged by smugglers not to a¤ect all immigrants equally but
to act as a positive selection with higher prices disproportionately reducing
the ow of lower income immigrants.5 In this context, the sale of visas,
4Illegal migration represents a sizeable proportion of the foreign population living
in high wages countries. In Europe for example, the Clandestino Research Project
estimates that 1.8 to 3.3 million irregular foreign residents live in the old Mem-
ber States of the EU15 in 2008 (See at: http://clandestino.eliamep.gr/ or Dustmann
and Frattini, 2011). This represents 0.46% to 0.83% of their population and 7%
to 12% of their foreign population. Worldwide, the International Labour Organi-
sation estimates that 10 to 15 per cent of migration today involves migration un-
der irregular situations i.e. entering or working in countries without authorization
(http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/2006/106B09_492_engl.pdf).
5Similar e¤ects were reported by multiple contemporary accounts following the
cartelization of the shipping industry at the turn from the 19th to the 20th century (see
Deltas et al 2008).
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which will push down smugglerss prices, will worsen the skill composition of
migrants.
To be more specic, in our model the demand comes from workers who
choose to work in the foreign country or in the origin country, weighing the
benets of higher wages in foreign countries against migration costs. Migra-
tion price is determined by smugglers who maximise their prots. Policies
shape the market structure. They may reinforce the market power of the
smugglers by increasing their costs to operate and hence their prices, or
force them to propose lower prices to compete with the visas on sale. We
will see that neither traditional repressive measures nor more "innovative"
pricing tools through the sale of visas are satisfactory policies. The former
help to control migration ows but, far from suppressing smugglers, they
may even increase their market power and the price paid by the migrants
for their service. The latter help to eradicate smugglers activities at the
cost of substantially increasing migration ows. The paper then explores
how a combination of these measures may be e¤ective at eradicating human
smuggling and controlling migration ows, without necessarily increasing the
budget decit.
To illustrate the importance of combining repression and legalisation to
control demand we calibrate the price of visas, which would drive smugglers
out of business. Using our model and estimates from previous studies on
Chinese migration to the US, this price varies between around $18000 when
the risk of deportation for illegal migrants is low (i.e., 20%) and around
$50000 in case of high risk (i.e., 70%). With a high risk of deportation for
illegal migrants it is easier for the government to apply a high price for the
visas, which will eliminate smugglers. Several reasons why such combinations
of pricing and repression instruments have not yet been implemented are
discussed with the policy implications of the paper.
Link with the literature
The idea of selling visas to regulate migration ows has already fed many
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debates in the general press and blogs, and policy proposals have discussed
di¤erent ways of implementing it, notably through auctions (Simon, 1989,
Becker, 2002, the Becker-Posner blog of 31rst July 2005, Freeman, 2006, Saint
Paul, 2009, Orrenius and Zavodny 2010, The Economist, 24 June 2010).6 The
proponents argue that selling visas allows a government to both collect money
and control migration ows instead of fuelling maas by further restricting
migration. The opponents argue that the sale of visas may generate a new
type of bonded labour between indebted migrants and their employers and
that the market does not necessarily allocate resources e¢ ciently. However
these arguments are even more compelling for the illegal migration market, on
which candidates are less likely to get formal loans to pay the high smugglers
fees.
Despite the controversy, selling visas to eliminate the smuggling industry
and regulate the market has not yet been analysed.7 Our goal is to study
the possibility of using standard economic tools such as market and prices to
eliminate the smugglers, and their impacts on the migration market. More-
over we will show that this involves combining carefully the sale of visas with
repression measures. Usually these two types of public intervention are per-
ceived as conicting, and are hence discussed separately by policy makers.
Yet the analysis below shows that they are complementary if one aims at
eradicating human smuggling while controlling migration ows.
By studying the response by smugglers to policy measures, our paper is
close in spirit to Friebel and Guriev (2006), who model how smugglers es-
tablish labour/debt contracts with poor migrants, which force them to repay
6With the same aim of designing market tools to control migration ows, Moraga and
Rapoport (2013) have set up a model where host countries trade immigration quotas.
7This legalisation policy will hence be very di¤erent from exceptional amnesties, which
have been repeatedly granted in the past to illegal migrants living in European countries
such as Spain, Greece or in the US and pose an obvious problem of time consistency and
credibility of the state. See Chau, 2001, Epstein and Weiss, 2001, Karlson et al., 2003,
Solano, 2009 on the rationale and optimal design of amnesties. See Maas, 2009, on their
questionable e¤ectiveness at decreasing the number of illegal migrants.
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their fee. In this context, they show that deportation and border control
policies do not have the same e¤ects on illegal migration: stricter depor-
tation policies may increase the ow of illegal immigrants and worsen the
skill composition of immigrants while stricter border controls decrease over-
all immigration and may result in an increase in debt-nanced migration. A
key assumption of their model is that migrants are liquidity constrained and
cannot pay upfront the fee, which gives rise to these contracts.8 In a dif-
ferent context where contracts are not legally enforceable between tra¢ ckers
and smuggled migrants, which leads to migrantsexploitation, Tamura (2010)
shows that destination countries with limited resources may prefer to improve
the apprehension of smugglers and their clients at the border rather than in-
land. Similarly, in a setting of asymmetric information, Tamura (2013) shows
that improved inland apprehension may increase the incidence of migrants
exploitation. Our paper complements this literature by studying the indus-
trial organisation of the smuggling industry. In particular it helps to explain
where the high prices, which lead to the establishment of labour/debt con-
tracts rst analysed by Friebel and Guriev (2006) come from.
In contrast to these two papers we do not study liquidity constrained
nor tra¢ cked migrants.9 We focus on unconstrained workers who use the
services of smugglers to willingly migrate illegally. This allows us to derive
tractable results on the e¤ects of a larger set of policy measures - sale of
visas versus more traditional repressive policies through border enforcement,
deportation or employerssanctions - on the equilibrium of the market for
smuggled migrants. Our results show that only a combination of themmay be
8Migrants may also respond to these debt labour contracts by choosing optimally the
duration of repayment period and consumption behaviour and this a¤ects the complemen-
tarities between border controls, deportation measures and employer sanctions as studied
by Djaji´c and Vinogradova, 2011.
9Note that nancial constraints are likely to be less binding with the introduction of
visas as migrants could more easily get loans. And legalisation diminishes the scope for
human tra¢ cking as laws can be more easily enforced against exploitative smugglers (see
Friebel and Guriev, 2006, on indebted migrants; Tamura, 2010, 2013 or Mahmoud and
Trebesch, 2010 on tra¢ cked migrants).
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e¤ective at both eliminating smugglersbusinesses and controlling migration
ows, and that it also limits the increases in budget decit entailed by stricter
controls. Our results are robust to the introduction of risk, which, with
the noticeable exceptions of Woodland and Yoshida (2006) and Vinogradova
(2010), has rarely been addressed in previous studies on illegal immigration
control.
The theoretical literature on illegal immigration control, following the
seminal paper by Ethier (1986), focuses on risk neutral agents. Epstein et
al.(1999) take into account its dynamic aspects, as migrants who enter legally
may subsequently move into the illegal sector in order to avoid deportation
and Djaji´c (1999) investigates its counterproductive e¤ects as migrants may
move into new sectors and new areas, where new migration networks may
form. In practice countries such as Israel, Cyprus and Lebanon have tried to
regulate long distance migration through local agencies located in South East
Asian countries such as Philippines and Sri Lanka. These legal intermediaries
organise the shipment of cheap labour force to compensate for shortages in
labour. As migrants under these schemes are obliged to return to their home
country at the end of their contract, this is the source of another type of
illegal migration from those overstaying illegally in the destination country
(Djaji´c, 2011, Schi¤, 2011). However, none of these papers takes into account
the organisation of the supply side of the market by smugglers, which is the
main focus of our paper, as well as the associated risk it entails for the
migrants.
The empirical literature investigates the determinants of illegal migration
and assesses its responsiveness to border enforcement measures (Donato et
al., 1992, Massey and Espinosa, 1997, Hanson and Spilimbergo, 1999, Hanson
et al., 2002, Angelucci 2012). These papers focus on cross border migration
between the US and Mexico and point to a small or insignicant e¤ect of
stricter deportation rules and stricter border controls after the Immigration
Reform and Control Act (for a review see Hanson, 2006) on migration ows.
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For example, using detailed data on cross-border trips of illegal workers from
the Mexican Migration Project, Gathman (2008) shows that when the price
to cross the border with the help of coyotes increases, migrants may choose
to migrate by their own means and forego the services of smugglers by taking
additional risks to cross the border in more remote areas.
However, we expect long distance migration to respond di¤erently to
smugglersprices as it is not feasible without their services. Although there
is no evidence on the price elasticity of long haul illegal migration, we know
from history that long distance legal migration responded strongly to changes
in the market structure of shipping cartels at the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury. This has been tested empirically by Deltas et al (2008), who show that
the existence of relatively tight, well-organized cartels restricted the ow of
transatlantic migrants below what would have occurred in a more compet-
itive environment. Today, long haul illegal migration still entails sizeable
costs, which may continue to be prohibitively expensive for poor workers
and depend strongly on the industrial organisation of smugglers.
Our work also dovetails with the literature on the economics of crime,
which documents the role played by highly organised networks of smugglers
(Aronowitz, 2001; Futo and Jandl, 2007; Guerette and Clarke, 2005). Lund-
gren (2008) illustrates the imperfect competition prevailing among smugglers
operating in Belarus and Ukraine in a duopoly model. Consistent with this
literature we build a model where oligopolistic smugglers o¤er their services.
Since cartelisation of smugglers may vary across routes and may also change
over time, we leave exible the degree of market concentration. It is in-
deed straightforward in our model to endogenise the number of smugglers
to capture the e¤ects of increased repression in our general set-up of human
smuggling markets. Simultaneously with the supply of services we determine
the demand from would-be migrants and study the e¤ects of selling visas to
legalise migration on the market equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the
8
set-up of the model and describes the market structure for illegal migration
under status quo (absence of legalisation). Section 3 studies the e¤ects of
introducing pricing tools and repressive measures to regulate migration ows.
Section 4 extends our model by taking into account the strong uncertainty
that represents illegal migration for risk averse individuals. Section 5 uses
calibrations to illustrate the policy implications of the model and Section 6
concludes.
2 Migration equilibrium
This section studies the migration market equilibrium, when workers pay a
migration price to the smugglers, p, to migrate illegally to a high wages desti-
nation country. We thereby assume that individuals need to hire a smuggler
to migrate.10 For simplicity of exposition, the analysis is rst derived under
the assumption that illegal migration entails no risk or equivalently that in-
dividuals are risk neutral. Section 4 shows that our results are robust to the
introduction of risk aversion.
2.1 Demand for illegal migration
At the beginning of her working life of total duration 1, a worker maximises
her lifetime utility. She chooses to locate either abroad or in her home country
and consumes all her income.11
Potential candidates for illegal migration are heterogeneous according to
10Although gures vary a lot across destination countries, we expect this to be the case
where it is di¢ cult to migrate through di¤erent channels, in particular when migration
policies are very restrictive and when geographical borders do not exist between origin
and destination countries. In the UK for example smugglers are involved in around 75%
of detected cases of illegal border crossing (IND, 2001).
11As the model is static, there is no sequential decision. However would-be migrants
internalize the risk of deportation and sanctions of their employers. In the risk-neutral
case this translates into a lower expected wage to work in the illegal sector than in the
legal sector. In the risk averse extension risk is modeled explicitly.
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their labour e¢ ciency (or skill), , which is distributed identically and in-
dependently according to the density function f() and distribution F ()
over

; 

with   0. Term  can be interpreted as the threshold of
skill/education level above which workers can apply for legal visas under the
current system of selective migration characterising most OECD countries.12
If there is no migration visa for sale, we assume that workers can only work
in the illegal sector of the economy such that expected earnings abroad are
dwf , with wf being the wages in the legal sector and d < 1. The discount
factor d captures the fact that workers would have more opportunities if
they worked legally rather than illegally13 and that there is a risk entailed by
working illegally. We assume for the moment that d is exogenous but we will
relax this assumption later on, in line with empirical evidence (Cobb-Clark
et al., 1995).
Note that the way we model the returns to skills leads to a positive se-
lection of illegal migrants, which characterises long haul migration. Indeed
"Greater distances, [...] and (for the poorest regions) the poverty constraint
all imply that US and EU migrants coming from farther away should be
more positively selected" (Hatton and Williamson, 2008). Accordingly, the
empirical evidence on long haul legal migration points to positive selection
(see Akee, 2010 on migrants from Federated States of Micronesia to the US
during 1995-1997 or Beine et al, 2007 on migration to countries of the Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). Similarly, long
distance illegal migration, which is di¢ cult to undertake without the help of
smugglers and is very costly for workers from low wages countries, leads to
a more positive selection of workers than that which has been documented
for the Mexican cross border migration (see Rivera-Batiz, 2004 for a com-
12Instead of considering skill heterogeneity, we could easily embed into the model other
dimensions of heterogeneity, which may a¤ect the returns to migration (such as physical
abilities or degrees of risk aversion in the extended model with risk outlined below) without
changing its main results.
13It is for example the case if they cannot easily change employer in the illegal sector or
if they are caught in a debt-labour contract upon arrival (see Friebel and Guriev, 2006).
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parative analysis of Mexican and non-Mexican illegal migrants in the US
and Camarota, 2012 for descriptive statistics on education and income by
country of origin of both legal and illegal migrants in the US).14 Although
we present the model in the case of positive selection, Appendix J discusses
the robustness of our main results to the case of negative selection.
The worker knows the discounted income she will earn in the foreign coun-
try on the illegal market, dwf , which is assumed higher than the discounted
income in home country wh:
dwf > wh
Note also that the labour market is considered exogenous, which is justied
by the fact that the number of workers on the labour market is very large
as compared to the ows of migrants. Earnings in the foreign country are
used to repay the smugglers fee p and to consume dwf   p. If the worker
does not migrate, she consumes wh in the origin country.15 Therefore the
worker decides to migrate if her life time utility, equal to u(dwf   p) in case
she migrates, is higher than her utility in case she does not migrate, equal
to u(wh). With increasing utility functions, the migration condition can be
rewritten as:
wh < dwf   p
This shows that a worker is more likely to migrate the higher the wage
di¤erential between foreign and home countries, the higher her skill level
(what we called "positive selection") and the lower the migration costs.
14Even in the case of cross border migration between Mexico and the US, Chiquiar
and Hanson (2005) and Borger (2011) show evidence of intermediary selection in the
more recent high-costs migration period due to liquidity constrained and stricter border
enforcements, which also increased skill average composition of migrants (Orrenius and
Zavodny, 2005).
15She perfectly knows the wages per unit of time that she will get at home and abroad
and the discount rate. She computes the net present value of her future ow of income.
Since wages and discount rate are exogenous we avoid introducing separate notation and
directly focus on net present values.
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Solving for the skill level such that an individual is indi¤erent between
migrating illegally or not, we obtain the illegal migration threshold I written
as:
I :=
p
dwf   wh (1)
And aggregating over the distribution of skills, we obtain the demand for
illegal migration as a function of migration price p:
DI(p) =
Z 
I
f()d = 1  F (I) (2)
As I increases with p and decreases with d, the demand for migration is
higher the lower the migration price, p, and the higher the wage di¤erential
dwf   wh between the two countries.
2.2 Supply of services
Because legal restrictions constitute barriers to market entry, the smuggling
business is concentrated. A few criminal networks actually provide the service
(see Aronowitz, 2001; Futo and Jandl, 2007; Guerette and Clarke, 2005,
Lundgren, 2008). We model the oligopolistic market for illegal migration as
a generalized Cournot competition. We focus on symmetric equilibrium (i.e.,
each smuggler has the same market share). The generalized Cournot price
with N smugglers, pN , is such that:
pN   c
pN
=
1
N
1
"DI ;p
(3)
where c represents their marginal costs, "DI ;p is the price elasticity of demand
and N is an integer greater than 1. The generalized Cournot competition
demand, DI(pN); is between the two extreme cases: DI(pm)  DI(pN) 
DI(c) for all N  1 where pm  p1 in the monopoly case (when N = 1) and
p1 = c in the competitive case when N !1. The detail of the computation
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and an illustration in the case of uniform distribution is given in Appendix
A.
It is worth noting that the smugglers might face di¤erent populations of
migrants. For instance, illiterate candidates from rural areas are di¤erent
from educated workers from urban centers. If the oligopolistic smugglers can
identify them, they will apply di¤erent prices to these di¤erent populations.
As is standard with third degree price discrimination, groups endowed with
the largest price elasticity will get the smallest price. In contrast captive
migrants (i.e., groups with low price elasticity) face higher prices.16
3 Sale of visas
This section studies the e¤ects of selling visas when the smugglers have al-
ready paid for the xed costs of smuggling. In order to eradicate smugglers
the government might try to legalize the market for migration. To do so, it
can create a permit to migrate permanently that people can buy. A simple
idea would be to create a permit that will cost the same price, pL, as the
price imposed by the smugglers to illegal migrants, denoted pI : pL = pI .
However, this policy will increase migration ows. Comparing the legal mi-
gration threshold, written as L = p
wf wh , with (1), it is easy to see that,
for any given migration price p, the legal migration threshold is always lower
than the illegal one: L(p) < I(p) 8p > 0. This is because migration pay-
o¤s are higher under legal than illegal migration, which increases the wage
di¤erential between foreign and home countries. More importantly such a
16Assume that they are J di¤erent pools of migrants identied by j = 1; :::; J . The skill
parameter of workers in group j are distributed identically and independently according
to the density function fj() and distribution Fj() over

j ; j

. Their wages might
also be type dependent: fwfj ; whjg. The demand for migration in group j is DIj (p) =R j
Ij (p)
fj()d = 1   Fj(Ij (p)), where Ij (p) = pdwfj whj . The optimal smuggler prices
determined by (3) vary from one group to the other according to the price elasticity of its
demand "DIj ;p =  
pDI0j (p)
DIj (p)
.
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pricing policy of legal migration will not eradicate smuggling.
To determine the pricing scheme for legal migrants the government, a
Stackelberg leader, needs to take into account that the smugglers will react
to its policy.17 The model is thus solved by backwards induction.
3.1 Smugglersreaction to sale of visas
By comparing the payo¤s if an individual of type  migrates legally, wf pL,
with the payo¤s if she migrates illegally, dwf   pI , we can determine the
threshold type, L; dened as :
L :=
pL   pI
(1  d)wf (4)
such that any individual above this threshold prefers to migrate legally than
illegally. We can easily check that @L=@d > 0: This simply says that the
larger the income di¤erential between the legal and illegal sectors, the more
individuals prefer to migrate legally than illegally.
Using (1), we can write the threshold type I = p
I
dwf wh above which an
individual prefers to migrate illegally through the smugglers than to stay
in her origin country. If L < I nobody chooses to migrate illegally. A
constraint for the smugglers is to x their price low enough as compared to
the price of a legal permit in order to attract the workers of type between I
and L:
This constraint can be written as : p
I
dwf wh <
pL pI
(1 d)wf or, equivalently, as:
pI <
dwf   wh
wf   wh p
L (5)
This shows that the lower the relative payo¤s of illegal migration as compared
to legal migration, captured by the ratio dwf wh
wf wh , and the lower the legal
17Once the government announces its policy, it must stick to it to be credible. The
smugglers adjust their prices in reaction to the legal o¤er.
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price of migration, pL, the more di¢ cult it is for the smugglers to satisfy this
constraint.
Under this constraint, the demand faced by the smugglers is:
DI(pI ; pL) =
Z pL pI
(1 d)wf
pI
dwf wh
f()d: (6)
Let pN(pL) be the solution of (3) computed with the direct price elasticity of
demand (6), "DI ;pI =  @D
I(pI ;pL)
@pI
pI
DI(pI ;pL)
, which depends on pL . The price
reaction function of the smugglers is the solution of the following equation:18
pI(pL) =
(
pN(pL) if c  pN(pL) < dwf wh
wf wh p
L
? otherwise
(7)
3.2 Government policies
Illegal activities linked to human smuggling entail large negative externalities
for societies. In Mexico for example, human smuggling is often integrated
with the drug business and other criminal activities, which lead to high inse-
curity and became recently one of the main electoral concerns.19 This is also
true for OECD countries, where governments spend considerable resources
in an attempt to eradicate this industry. For example, Sweden and Australia
have recently adopted strict policies against such criminal networks.20 This
section studies how economic tools can be used to reach this objective and
18Appendix C presents the closed form solution obtained in the uniform distribution
case (see equation (33)).
19The Economist, June 30, 2011. Time Magazine, August 12, 2003 :
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,474582-2,00.html
20In its budget 2011-2012 the Australian Government has for instance specically ear-
marked "$292 million to support a new Regional Cooperation Framework that will help
put people smugglers out of business and prevent asylum seekers making the dangerous
journey to Australia by boat." See the Webpage of the Australian Government:
http://www.ag.gov.au/Publications/Budgets/Budget2011/Mediareleases/Pages/
Strengtheningourbordersthroughregionalcooperation.aspx
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their e¤ects on the migration market.
3.2.1 Eliminating smugglers
We rst consider a policy, which aims at breaking all incentives to smuggle.
It consists of applying a low enough price for legal migration such that the
smugglers will have non positive prots. This requires that the reaction price
is pushed below the marginal costs, i.e. pI(pL)  c.
The threshold price, denoted pL, below which the smugglers exit the
market is such that L = I dened respectively in equations (4) and (1) for
pI = c. That is, pL is such that:
pL c
(1 d)wf =
c
dwf wh . This yields:
pL =
wf   wh
dwf   wh c (8)
In other words, the government that wants to push smugglersreaction price
down until their mark-up vanishes has to apply the price pL. Note that this
result applies to any initial structure of the market for smugglers: monopolist,
oligopolistic or competitive. Irrespective of the initial market conditions, if
the government wants to eradicate smugglers by selling visas it has to apply
pL such that the smugglers end up reaching their marginal costs pricing.
Comparing pL = wf wh
dwf wh c and p
1 = c we can establish, since d < 1, that
the price imposed by the government to eliminate the smugglers is higher than
the price imposed by smugglers under perfect competition. Nevertheless, the
migration demand, which is now legal, can be written as:
DL(pL) =
Z 
c(
wf wh
dwf wh )
wf wh
f()d
DL(pL) = 1  F

c
dwf   wh

(9)
This demand is exactly the same as the demand for illegal migration under
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perfect competition of smugglers: DL(pL) = DI(c): This is because, for
a given migration price, more workers are willing to migrate legally than
illegally. This result, which is robust to the introduction of risk aversion, is
summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 1 A policy that reduces the number of illegal migrants to zero
through the sale of visas yields the same level of migration as under perfect
competition among smugglers.
It is not possible to empirically test the predictions of Proposition 1 since
no country has, so far, used such a pricing scheme to eradicate human smug-
gling. However, the theoretical framework, which is quite general, applies
to other markets with positive demand and legal prohibition. The theory
predicts that destroying a maa organisation by legalizing its activity will
inevitably increase the demand of the formerly prohibited product or ser-
vice. It is thus useful to look at other products and services, such as alcohol,
drugs or sexual services, that are, or have been, successively prohibited and
legalised to assess the relevance of Proposition 1.
The main problem to test the impact of prohibition on consumption is the
lack of data on trade volume during prohibition time. However, using mor-
tality, mental health and crime statistics, Miron and Zwiebel (1991) estimate
the consumption of alcohol during Prohibition in the US (1920-1933). They
nd that alcohol consumption fell sharply at the beginning of Prohibition,
to approximately 30% of its pre-Prohibition level. During the next several
years alcohol consumption increased, but remained below its pre-Prohibition
level, at about 60-70%. Consumption increased to approximately its pre-
Prohibition level only during the decade after Prohibition was abolished.
Another piece of evidence concerns prices. The theory predicts a sharp
decrease in prices if one aims at eliminating maa through legalisation. In
line with this, Miron (2003) shows that cocaine and heroin are substantially
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more expensive than they would be in a legalized market: "the data imply
that cocaine is four times as expensive as it would be in a legal market, and
heroin perhaps nineteen times."
Finally, regarding the sex market, Poulin (2005) claims that the legalisa-
tion of prostitution in countries such as the Netherland, Germany or Aus-
tralia, has generated an expansion of this industry: "An "abolitionist" coun-
try like France, with a population estimated at 61 million, has half as many
prostituted people on its territory as does a small country like the Nether-
lands (16 million) and 20 times fewer than a country like Germany, with a
population of around 82.4 million."
It is clear that more empirical studies are called to understand the conse-
quences of legalisation through sale of visas. Yet, based on the theory and on
the available empirical evidence on other illegal markets, we predict a sharp
increase in migration ows if visas are sold at the price that drive the smug-
glers out of business and that the higher the initial market concentration the
larger the increase following the legalisation.
3.2.2 The policy trade-o¤: controlling migration ows
Such increases may not be acceptable in most OECD countries, where there
is a strong popular demand for controlling migration ows. As we mentioned
earlier we do not discuss here the optimality of such an objective but simply
analyse whether standard economic instruments can help to reach it. We
thus study what happens if the government sells visas to control migration
ows. A constraint for the government is that the price of these visas, pL, has
to be lower than pL, the threshold price above which no worker will migrate
legally. This threshold is the minimum value of two constraints:
 The Incentive Rationality (IR) constraint: pL  (wf   wh), which
implies that someone at least prefers to migrate legally than stay at
home, and
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 The Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraint: pL  (1   d)wf + pI ,
which implies that someone at least prefers to migrate legally than
illegally.
The legal migration is positive if and only if pL  min
n
(wf  wh); (1 
d)wf + p
I
o
. Since by assumption, dwf > wh it is easy to check that the
(IC) constraint is binding whenever the smugglers are active. Indeed (wf  
wh) > (1   d)wf + pI is equivalent to pI < (dwf   wh), which, by virtue
of (1), necessarily holds when the smugglers are active. We deduce that
pL = (1   d)wf + pI . Since the smugglers price, pI(pL), is endogenously
determined in equation (7), the threshold pL is a xed point such that:
pL = (1  d)wf + pI(pL) (10)
Under the assumption that @
2DI(pI ;pL)
@pI@pL
 0, which is true as long as f 0() 
0 (e.g., with a uniform distribution of skills @
2DI(pI ;pL)
@pI@pL
= 0), one can check
that dp
I(pL)
dpL
> 0 (see Appendix B). This implies that pL exists and is unique.
Indeed if pL = 0 then (1  d)wf + pI(0) > 0, while (1  d)wf + pI(+1) =
(1  d)wf + pN < +1 where pN is dened in equation (3). We deduce that
pL and (1  d)wf + pI(pL) cross once and only once at pL > 0. It is worth
noting that, contrary to pL which is invariant, pL depends on N the number
of smugglers active in the market.21
We want to study the objective function of a government that would aim
at minimizing the increase in migration ows following the introduction of
sale of visas. Since the status quo level of immigration is independent of the
new policy to sell visas, this objective is equivalent to minimizing migration
21This result illustrated in Appendix in the uniform distribution example is intuitive:
the upper limit for visa prices decreases with the number of smugglers on the market since
their response price decreases with the degree of competition and the government has to
compete with them to encourage legal migration.
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ows following this scheme. By using (1) the objective function is :
min
pLpL
Z 
pI (pL)
dwf wh
f()d = min
pLpL

1  F

pI(pL)
dwf   wh

(11)
where the government internalizes the reaction function of the smuggler
pI(pL) in (7). Since dp
I(pL)
dpL
> 0 di¤erentiating equation (11) with respect
to pL yields   1
dwf whf

pI(pL)
dwf wh

dpI(pL)
dpL
 0. A government, which aims at
minimizing migration ows, will x the highest possible price for its visas pL.
The migration demand under such policy is higher than in the case of
an unconstrained smuggler oligopoly. Indeed when pL  pL  (wf   wh);
the smugglers are the only ones to be active on the market as nobody wants
to migrate legally if the smugglers apply their optimal reaction price pI(pL).
However they cannot apply the unconstrained oligopoly price pN of equation
(3) as some migrants would then choose legal migration, lowering the smug-
glersprot. This entails larger migration ows even though no visa is sold
in such case.22
Figure 1 illustrates this result in the uniform example. It shows the
reaction function pI(pL) as dened by (7) where the slope of the active part
of the reaction function, pN(pL) = p
L
N+1
dwf wh
wf wh +
N
N+1
c, decreases with N  1
(see equation (33) in the appendix). It becomes at when N goes to innity
(i.e. it converges to the constant value of c).23
Moreover, since there is positive selection through long haul migration,
more migration following a sale of visas worsens the average skill composition
22Smugglers are unconstrained to apply their oligopolistic price only when pL > (wf  
wh).
23With the uniform distribution example, replacing pI(pL) = p
L
N+1
dwf wh
wf wh +
N
N+1c into (10) the upper limit for the visa price satises: p
L =
[Nc+ (1 +N)(1  d)wf ] wf wh(1 d)wf+N(wf wh) . Comparing the reaction smugglers price
pI(pL) with the unconstrained smugglersoligopoly price pN dened in (3) it is straight-
forward to check that pI(pL)  pN if and only if dwf   wh  c, which is the necessary
condition for the smugglers being active in the rst place (see Appendix C).
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of migrants.
The next proposition, which is robust to the introduction of risk-aversion,
summarizes the policy result this section implies:
Proposition 2 A sale of visas necessarily increases the total number of mi-
grants and worsens their skill composition.
Proposition 2 implies that a government that aims at minimizing the
demand for migration, cannot do better than an unconstrained monopoly
smuggler. So, if the objective is to decrease the total number of migrants,
there are more e¤ective policies than selling migration visas.
3.2.3 Controlling migration ows through increased repression
Using our results in Section (2) it is straightforward to check that any in-
strument that either increases the market concentration through increasing
smugglersentry sunk cost, or increases their costs to operate, c, or decreases
the benets gained by illegal migrants, d, decreases migration demand.
The analysis of smugglers pricing behavior outlines that repressive policy
measures may have very di¤erent e¤ects depending on whether they directly
a¤ect the smuggling business or the demand for their services: any measure
which increases the marginal costs for smugglers to operate, c, such as in-
creased border enforcement will necessarily increase the fees paid by would be
migrants. This has been documented by Roberts et al (2010) who show that
the increase in enforcement on the Southwest border of the US accounted
for all of the increase in smuggling costs during 2006-2008 and half of it dur-
ing 2004-2008. In contrast, measures, which decrease the benets of illegal
migration through a decrease in d, such as sanctions to employers of ille-
gal workers that are transmitted into lower wages paid to illegal migrants,
decrease the fees charged by smugglers (see equation (25) in Appendix).
In a more dynamic perspective, one could easily endogenise N , the num-
ber of smugglers on the market. Denoting K the level of sunk costs to enter
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this market, the number of smugglers N is the integer part of  such that
() = K where () = (p   c)DI(p)= is the rm rent. Therefore any
repressive measure increasing c or K reduces the number of smugglers on the
market, N , thereby increasing the price they charge for their services. For
example, Roberts et al (2010) note that rising smuggling prices during 2004-
2008 also "indicate increased demand for smuggling services whose supply is
limited, or changing characteristics of the marketplace such as the formation
of cartels by smugglers". So, if migrants have no other alternative to migrate
than using smugglersservices, as assumed in our model, this pushes down
the demand for migration.
3.2.4 A¤ordable migration control through sale of visas
So far we have considered two types of policies: one policy relies on pricing
schemes and economic tools to eliminate smuggling, while the other policy
is essentially repressive and aims at controlling illegal migration ows. Both
solutions are politically unsatisfactory. The former leads to an increase in
migration ows, while the latter does not eradicate smugglers and increases
their market power (i.e., market concentration). In what follows we explore
how a combination of both types of approaches might help to simultaneously
ght the smugglers and control migration ows, without increasing the bur-
den of public decit. To do so, we consider a policy where the funds raised
from the sale of the legal permits are used to ght illegal migration by in-
creasing c and decreasing d in such a way that increases in migration ows
following the legalisation are limited as much as is a¤ordable.
We start from the status quo situation where the marginal cost to smuggle
is c and the discount rate to work as an illegal workers is d. The government
can use a share of the new funds raised through the sale of migration permits
to increase the smugglersmarginal costs by reinforcing "external" (or border)
controls. We denote c(R1) the marginal costs that the smugglers face when
the government invests R1  0 in additional repression. We assume that,
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in the absence of additional investment, the marginal costs of the smuggler
are the status quo level: c(0) = c. Moreover we assume that c0(R1) > 0 and
c00(R1) < 0. The concave shape indicates decreasing returns to scale in the
ght against smugglers.
Similarly, the government can use another share of the funds raised through
the sale of visas to increase "internal" controls at worksites and enforce the
sanctions paid by the employers of illegal migrants. We denote d(R2) the
illegal migrant wage discount factor resulting from increased enforcement
measures. Here again we assume that, in the absence of additional invest-
ment d(0) = d, and that d0(R2) < 024 and d00(R2) > 0. The convex shape
indicates decreasing returns to scale in the ght against illegal employment.
Replacing c by c(R1) and d by d(R2) in (8), we can determine the new
legal migration price such that smugglers do not have any interest to operate
given their inated marginal costs and reduced migrant wages:
pL(R1; R2) =
wf   wh
d(R2)wf   wh c(R1) (12)
We deduce that the increase in demand following the introduction of the sale
of visas for legal migration would be dened in (9) with the price pL being
replaced by pL(R1; R2):
DL(R1; R2) = 1  F

c(R1)
d(R2)wf   wh

(13)
Finally, the government chooses the investments R1 and R2 so as to minimize
the increase in migration ows following the introduction of visas, under the
constraint that the cost of repression is covered by the visa sales:
min
R1;R2
DL(R1; R2) s.t. R1 +R2  DL(R1; R2)pL(R1; R2): (14)
24See Woodland and Yoshida, 2006, for a theoretical foundation of this assumption and
Cobb-Clark et al.(1995) for empirical evidence.
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Focusing on interior solutions the optimal a¤ordable policy, which is derived
in Appendix D, is summarized in the next proposition.25
Proposition 3 A government that aims at dismantling smugglers while lim-
iting migration ows without increasing its budget decit invests the amounts
(R1; R

2) solution of the following equations:
R1 +R2 = p
L(R1; R2)D
L(R1; R2) (15)
c0(R1)
c(R1)
=
 d0(R2)wf
d(R2)wf   wh (16)
Equation (15) shows that the government invests the maximum possible
amount in reinforcing border controls and employers sanctions, which is
a¤ordable through the sale of visas. The optimal allocation of the budget
for repression is such that the marginal impact of R1 on DL is equal to the
marginal impact of R2 on DL, as shown by (16). Note that enforcing the
nes paid by employers of undocumented workers may contribute to raising
additional funds for the government, which could easily be embedded into
our model by adding a term (increasing with R2) on the right hand side of
the budget constraint in (14). The optimal investments R1 and R2 would be
changed accordingly.
Since the demand for visas is a normal good and since c0(R1) > 0 (al-
ternatively d0(R2) < 0) it is straightforward to check that
dDL(R1;R2)
dR1
< 0
(and that dD
L(R1;R2)
dR2
< 0). When repression against smugglers increases,
the marginal cost of their activity, c, increases, which is transmitted to the
smugglersprice. Similarly, when sanctions are enforced against employers
of illegal migrants, this is transmitted to the payo¤s of migrants through a
decrease in d. As a result the government can raise the price of legal visas
without fuelling smugglersdemand. This policy enables the government to
25Depending on the functions c(:) and d(:) it may be the case that the optimal solution
involves increasing c only (i.e., R2 = 0) or decreasing d only (i.e., R1 = 0). However, in
other cases there will be an interior solution dened in (15) and (16).
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control migration ows without relying on the help of smugglers. Indeed,
by construction, such policy pushes smugglers out of the market by eroding
their prots.
4 Risk aversion
So far we considered either situations entailing no risk or risk neutral indi-
viduals. It is probably more realistic to consider that individuals are risk
averse. As migrating illegally entails important risks, this may be of signi-
cance to determine the number and type of migrants. This section shows the
robustness of our results to the introduction of risk aversion. It reports only
the main results. For the detailed computations we refer to Appendix E.
We extend the model by introducing standard CARA utility function
u(x) = 1   exp( ax); where a is the absolute risk aversion parameter.26
We also assume that illegal migration entails a risk: once migrants pay the
sunk costs to the smugglers and reach the destination country, they may stay
abroad with probability 1   q, but have a probability q of being deported
and sent back to their home country. In order to compare the results in the
cases with and without risk aversion, we assume that if they manage to avoid
deportation while in migration, they earn a wage wf with   1 so that the
expected revenue from illegal migration is the same in the two cases. Since
in the case without risk aversion the expected revenue from illegal migration
is dwf with d < 1, in the case with risk aversion the expected revenue can
be written as:
(1  q)wf + qwh = dwf (17)
Any distortion can hence be ascribed to the introduction of the risk aversion.
26Results in this section are robust to using other specications of concave utility func-
tions, such as for example the log function, which is CRRA. However the computations
are messier. For the ease of the exposition we thus present here the simplest version with
CARA.
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One can check in Appendix E that the illegal migration threshold Ira is
now a solution of the following equation:
1  e apI
1  e a(wf wh) = 1  q (18)
The risk neutrality (and/or absence of risk) benchmark case of equation (1),
I = p
I
dwf wh , is simply obtained in equation (18) by setting q = 0, which
also implies, according to (17), that  = d. Since Ira is increasing with q and
since Ira = 
I when q = 0 we deduce that Ira > 
I for all q > 0. This shows
that, as we may expect, the risk of being deported discourages risk averse
individuals to migrate illegally.
The logic of the pricing scheme of smugglers described in section 2 remains
the same as before but it takes into account the new (lower) demand from risk
averse individuals. Risk aversion implies that the price imposed by smugglers
is then lower than the price they would impose to risk neutral individuals
with the same expected revenue from migration, an intuitive result formally
shown in Appendix E.
Lemma 1 Risk aversion limits the number of illegal migrants, Ira > 
I ,
and reduces the price imposed by smugglers pIra < p
I .
We now turn to the government policy of visa sale and the reaction of
smugglers. If individuals can buy a legal permit to migrate at price pL,
smugglers need to price their services low enough so that at least one indi-
vidual wishes to migrate illegally. The skill level Lra of the migrant who is
just indi¤erent between migrating illegally and legally satises the following
equation:
1  e a((wf wh)+pI pL)
1  e a(wf wh) = 1  q (19)
Solving for the threshold Lra and comparing it to (4) we show in Appendix
E that risk aversion increases the demand for legal visas as established by
Lemma 2.
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Lemma 2 Risk aversion increases the demand for legal visas: Lra < 
L.
When legal visas are put on sale, risk averse individuals are willing to
pay a higher price to get valid documentation. Since we also showed that
Ira > 
I , risk aversion reduces the illegal migration demand, DIra(p
I ; pL) =R Lra
Ira
f()d = F (Lra)   F (Ira), by the two ends. On the one hand, in the
absence of legal pricing schemes, illegal migration ows are lower if individ-
uals are risk averse than if they are risk neutral. On the other hand, selling
visas decreases illegal migration ows even further since individuals are less
willing to bear the risk of deportation.
For the sake of realism we focus on situations where smugglers are initially
active in equilibrium. Their reaction function, pIra(p
L), is the solution of the
same equation as in (7) using the demand DIra(p
I ; pL). If the government
wants to eliminate them by its pricing policy, it still needs to push their
reaction price to the limit value c so that Lra(c; p
L
ra
) = Ira(c). It follows
that Proposition 1 holds true under risk aversion.27 If the government wants
to eradicate smugglers through legalisation it will face the same demand
as under perfect competition among smugglers: DL(pL
ra
) = DIra(c). The
main di¤erence is that the demand is lower than in the risk neutral case,
DIra(c) < D
I(c):
We show in Appendix E that pL
ra
is increasing with q. Moreover, as for
q = 0 pL
ra
= pL; this implies that the visa price, which drives smugglers out
of business, is higher with risk (when q > 0) than without as established by
Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 Risk aversion increases the visa price, which drives the smug-
glers out of business: pL
ra
> pL:
Finally the results of section 3.2.2 are robust to the introduction of risk
aversion. If the smuggler is active the binding constraint is the IC and pLra is
27We can also see that Proposition 1 does not depend on the specication of the Demand
function. Hence it is robust to other specications of utility functions.
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the solution of the following equation derived in Appendix E:
e a(wf p
L) = (1  q)e a(wf pIra(pL)) + qe a(wh pIra(pL)) (20)
Therefore the rest of the reasoning and Proposition 2 hold true.
Proposition 3 can also be generalized taking into account the risk en-
tailed by migration. With risk averse migrants the government has more
instruments to raise the visa price that drives the smugglers out of busi-
ness and, hence, limit migration ows. By investing in repression it can, as
before, increase marginal costs for smugglers to operate through the increas-
ing concave function c(R1), or decrease the benets of working as an illegal
worker through the decreasing convex function (R2). In addition, it can
also increase the probability of deportation q through the increasing concave
function q(R3). This new instrument is relevant only under risk aversion. Let
pL(R1; R2; R3) =
wf wh
a((R2)wf wh) log

1 q(R3)
e c(R1)a q(R3)

be the price that eliminates
human smuggling and let
DL(R1; R2; R3) = 1 F

pL(R1;R2;R3)
wf wh

be the legal demand for visas associ-
ated with this price. Focusing on interior solutions Proposition 4 summarises
how these three instruments can be optimally combined.28
Proposition 4 A government that aims at dismantling smugglers while lim-
iting migration ows without increasing its budget decit invests the amounts
28Depending on the functions c(:), (:) and q(:) it may be the case that the optimal
solution involves repression to increase c only (i.e., R2 = R3 = 0), to decrease  only
(i.e., R1 = R3 = 0), to increase q only (i.e., R1 = R2 = 0), or any combination of two
instruments only (i.e., R1 = 0 or R2 = 0 or R3 = 0). However, in other cases there will
be an interior solution dened in (21) to (23).
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(R1; R

2; R

3) solution of the following equations:
R1 +R2 +R3 = D
L(R1; R2; R3)p
L(R1; R2; R3) (21)
c0(R1)ae c(R1)a
e c(R1)a   q(R3) =
 0(R2)wf
(R2)wf   wh log

1  q(R3)
e c(R1)a   q(R3)

(22)
=
q0(R3)
1  q(R3)
1  e c(R1)a
e c(R1)a   q(R3) (23)
As shown by equation (21) the government invests the total amount of
resources in reinforcing border controls, employerssanctions and deporta-
tions, which is raised through the sale of visas. And the optimal allocation
of repression between the various instruments equalises their marginal e¤ect
on demand (i.e., @D
L
@R1
= @D
L
@R2
= @D
L
@R3
) as shown by equations (22) and (23).
Moreover, we nd that the amount of investment in deportation, R3,
which minimizes migration ows, is higher than the investment minimising
expected earnings from illegal migration (see Appendix E). This result, in
line with Becker (1968), simply states that since individuals are risk averse,
they respond more strongly to a change in the probability of deportation
than to a "compensated" change in their earnings, which would leave equal
their expected earnings from migrating illegally.
The main issue raised by the policy of legalisation combined with tight
migration control is its e¤ectiveness at limiting migration ow without weigh-
ing too much on public nances. This ultimately depends on the elasticities
of the functions c(R1), (R2) and q(R3). Policy makers have to take into ac-
count that these elasticites vary from one country to the other. For example,
when there is a physical border between two countries it is di¢ cult to raise
smugglerscosts by increasing repression, as the evidence on illegal migration
between Mexico and the US mentioned in the introduction shows. Hence,
the elasticity of the function c(R) is likely to be low. By contrast, in the
case of long-haul migration, it might be easier to increase smugglerscosts
by reinforcing external controls. Similarly, in countries with a large informal
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sector, it will be harder to reduce , than in countries with a small informal
economy. With inelastic functions c(R1), (R2) and q(R3), the equilibrium
price of migration visas will be quite low. Such a policy of legalisation will
be ine¤ective at limiting migration ows, unless investments into additional
repression are extremely large. This poses a policy trade-o¤: high burden
on public nances or large increase in migration ows, which will be hard
to sustain politically. Moreover, in practice, the way the repressive policy
is set up is very important. The goal is to raise the smugglerscosts to in-
crease their concentration, and not necessarily to dismantle existing cartels.
Breaking established smugglers networks might give rise, through the emer-
gence of several smaller smuggler networks, to more competition in the illegal
migration business and, hence, to lower prices and higher demand.29
5 Policy Implications
As it is impossible to run regressions to test our model, this section uses cali-
brations to interpret its results and quantify the policy e¤ects outlined above
before discussing their implications. Since the model focuses on the migration
market and abstracts from other changes that may occur in the rest of the
economy as a consequence of increases in migration ows, the results are not
full-edged policy simulations.30 Yet they complete our theoretical analysis
by illuminating the strong complementarities existing between legalisation
policies through selling visas and repression.
29The failure of the "war on drugs" launched in the United States in the 1980s has
been partly explained by such e¤ects. The US authorities decided to inltrate the drug
maa to dismantle it. The inltration operation, which was very costly, was successful.
The dismantling of the well organized cartels which followed gave rise to the emergence
of many smaller drug networks ghting ercely in price to gain market share. As a result,
the consumption of cocaine increased in the US (see Poret 2002).
30In particular, adjustments on the labour market may dampen the initial incentives to
migrate, leading to smaller increases in migration ows following sale of visas than the
ones we calibrate.
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5.1 Simulations
We borrow most of the estimates used in our calibrations from Friebel and
Guriev, 2006, and from the information we have on the smuggling industry
from case-studies on Chinese smugglers such as Yun and Poisson, 2005.31
For all our simulations we also need some estimates of the degree of risk
aversion of would-be migrants, a, and of the deportation probabilities q,
which are typically di¢ cult to observe. Instead, we have some direct evidence
from Chinese smugglers reporting their marginal costs to operate at around
e8000 to cross the borders to France and higher to the US (Yun and Poisson,
2005), which we estimate to be around $10000 for our simulations.32 Using
this information, the lower bound of the price paid by Chinese to migrate
illegally to the US, pI = $35000, and our model we can infer a range of risk
parameters a compatible with a range of deportation probabilities, q (see
Appendix G). To perform some static comparative on the e¤ects of varying
the risk we vary q in the neighborhood of the chosen values. Finally, as there
is very little quantitative information on the degree of market concentration,
Tables J1 and J2 also analyse the sensitivity of our results when the number
of smugglers varies. For example Chin and Zhang, 2002, stress the existence
of several smugglers networks operating in China.33 All simulations are
explained in further details in Appendix H.
31Appendix F checks that the individual rationality constraint is satised for the wages
di¤erential observed between the US and China in 2005 as well as for a large range of wage
di¤erentials that have been reported between advanced and developing countries (Clemens
et al.,2009).
32This is an average. Marginal costs vary depending on the type of trip undertaken
and on the type of migrant. Some Chinese migrants obtain fake visas and invitations for
business trips, which allow them to travel directly by air. Others have to cross several
borders using several intermediary smugglers, which increases the overall marginal costs
of the operation.
33Comparing results of Table 1 with those in Tables J1 (N = 3) or J2 (N = 5) shows that
the e¤orts required to eliminate the smugglers and maintain migration demand constant
are smaller the higher the number of smugglers on the market, an intuitive result. It
is indeed less di¢ cult to ght against smugglers when their initial prot is low, which
decreases with the level of competition.
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Table 1: Policy implications for N=2 when risk q varies for di¤erent degrees of risk aversion a.
a 0.00000086 0.00001 0.00002 0.00004
q 0.68 0.7 0.72 0.48 0.5 0.52 0.38 0.4 0.42 0.18 0.2 0.22
pL
ra
43624 46575 49954 28232 29516 30924 23785 24726 25744 17755 18336 18957
D 0.43 0.49 0.55 0.32 0.36 0.41 0.28 0.32 0.36 0.20 0.24 0.30
c 2.73 2.50 2.26 2.67 2.50 2.33 2.67 2.50 2.34 2.70 2.50 2.32
 -0.48 -0.47 -0.46 -0.51 -0.51 -0.50 -0.52 -0.52 -0.51 -0.53 -0.53 -0.52
Note: prices pL
ra
are in USD.
Rows 3 and 4 of Table 1 simulate the visa price, pL
ra
in USD, that would
eradicate smugglers following a pure "visa sale" scheme (i.e. not using the
other available instruments to control migration) and the subsequent relative
increase in migration demand, D, predicted by our model. These increase
with the risk of deportation captured by the probabilities of deportation q
calibrated for each degree of risk aversion a considered successively in columns
(2) to (5).
We next allow the government to combine sale of visas with repressive in-
struments in order to control migration ows while elimiminating smugglers.
Since we do not know the functions c(:), q(:) and (:) it is not possible to
simulate the optimal combination of instruments described in Proposition 4.
Instead, we show how di¤erent repressive instruments may be combined with
a sale of visas to reach a "0 migration increase" objective while eradicating
human smuggling.
Policy makers may rst consider reinforcing border controls, which in-
creases marginal costs for smugglers to operate. Row 5 of Table 1 shows
that the relative increase in marginal costs necessary to reach these objec-
tives, c, is substantial, around 250%, and decreases with the probability of
deportation.34 Policy makers could alternatively reinforce the sanctions to
34For each degree of risk aversion displayed in each column, c decreases as q increases.
Note that, by construction of the pairs (a; q), each column is such that c = 2:50 for the
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employers of undocumented employees, which translates into lower expected
earnings abroad for illegal migrants. Row 6 of Table 1 shows that the relative
decrease in the discounting factor, , necessary to reach these objectives is
around 50% and decreases in magnitude with the probability of deportation.
These simulations show that the additional e¤orts required to combine
a sale of visas with migration control decrease with the probability of de-
portation. Indeed, when risk is low the di¤erential between smugglersprice
and marginal costs is large. As already shown in Lemma 1, when risk in-
creases smugglers have to lower their margin to be able to attract risk-averse
migrants. It is therefore easier to drive them out of business and keep migra-
tion demand constant when the risk of deportation increases. In other words,
our results highlight strong complementarities between di¤erent types of re-
pressive instruments and sale of visas.
5.2 Discussion
The optimal combination of the di¤erent repression instruments depends
on the elasticities of the functions c(R1), (R2) and q(R3). Although we
do not have precise estimates of them, it seems unlikely that the current
policy adopted by the US and most EU countries is optimal. There are
huge discrepancies between the amounts invested in border control versus
employers sanctions. For example, in 2008 in France, only 1706 labour
inspectors were employed for more than 3.8 million rms.35 Among those
rms, only 1.6 million, the largest ones, were eligible for a control although
many illegal migrants work in small construction rms and in restaurants.36
central value of q of the neighbourhood considered. Similar remarks hold for ; displayed
in Row 6 of the Table, which gets closer to zero as q increases.
35See the report "Linspection du travail en France en 2008", Ministère du travail, des
relations sociales, de la famille, de la solidarité et de la ville, Direction générale du travail
Service de lanimation territoriale de la politique du travail et de laction de linspection
du travail.
36With only 22590 controls to check for illegal workers, an eligible rm is inspected on
average once every 70 years, or alternatively faces a 1.42% probability of being inspected
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At the same time France has spent hundreds of millions of euros on repression
measures such as dismantling illegal immigrantscamps, police enforcement
at the borders and deportation measures. Similarly in the US, there is very
little enforcement against illegal immigration at worksites (Hanson, 2007).
Between 1999 and 2003, the number of man hours US immigration agents
devoted to worksite inspections declined from 480,000 to 180,000 hours and
few US employers who hire illegal immigrants are detected or prosecuted.37
But considerable amounts are invested in the controls of the US borders.38
For instance the Border Patrol, which was increased from 9,000 agents in
2001 to 20,000 in 2009, costs an estimated $4 billion annually.
It is puzzling that the US government is investing so little in stricter in-
ternal repression measures, which decrease  and increase q in our model,
and so much in external controls, which increase c. Indeed the evidence
on illegal migration between Mexico and the US shows that such a policy
is ine¤ective at limiting migration ows. By contrast the e¤ects of stricter
internal repression measures, which would increase penalties paid by employ-
ers of undocumented immigrants and deportation probabilities, are unknown
and understudied. Yet such policies have been e¤ective in other industries.
Focusing on the sex business, Poulin (2005) shows that repressive policy can
successfully decrease demand, when, as in Sweden, legislation is passed to
prosecute the customers, who are the nal users of the service. As technolo-
gies develop to detect forged documents, for example using biometric identity
cards, prosecuting rms that employ illegal workers could be a much more
each year and smaller rms face a 0 probability of inspection.
37The number of US employers paying nes of at least $5.000 for hiring unauthorized
workers was only fteen in 1990, which fell to twelve in 1994 and to zero in 2004 (see
"Immigration Enforcement : Preliminary Observations on Employment Verication and
Worksite Enforcement" GAO-05-822T June 21, 2005, cited by Hanson 2007, p19.)
38The Washington Post, July 18, 2010 reported that more than 670 miles of border
fences, walls, bollards and spikes that Congress decreed in 2006 at an estimated cost of
$4 billion (plus future maintenance) had been almost completed. Similarly the number of
man hours spent policing the US-Mexico border increased by 2.9 times between 1990 and
2005.
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cost e¤ective way to control illegal migration ows than border enforcement
measures. Moreover nes paid by employers would contribute to raising ad-
ditional funds.
Given the discrepancies between the investments in external and inter-
nal controls, the lack of e¤ectiveness of border enforcement measures and the
availability of new technologies, systematic controls of undocumented workers
at the workplace is a much more promising means of controlling illegal mi-
gration than border enforcement. It is striking that despite several attempts
to mandate participation by all U.S. employers in the E-Verify program, an
Internet-based system designed to check the employment authorization sta-
tus of employees, participation is still voluntary, with limited exceptions.
Small businesses and agricultural employers are strongly opposed to manda-
tory E-Verify and actively lobby against it.39 Similarly, within the European
Union, representatives of Business Europe are opposed to the Commissions
idea that employers should check the validity of residence permits to avoid
the risk of being excluded from public contracts and, under certain circum-
stances, penalised by temporary or permanent closure of their companies in
case of failure (Bertozzi, 2009).
6 Conclusion
This paper has addressed a simple question: is it possible to eliminate human
smuggling by selling visas and regulate migration ows ?
The answer is nuanced. When smugglers have already paid xed costs
to settle their businesses, it is di¢ cult for the government to compete. The
model shows that eliminating smugglers by proposing a low enough price
would be at the cost of increasing substantially migration ows and decreas-
ing the average skill level of migrants. For probabilities of deportation be-
39The American Farm Bureau Foundation stated in July that it "could have a signicant,
negative impact on US farm production, threatening the livelihoods of many farmers and
ranchers in labor intensive agriculture."
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tween 20% and 70% we estimate the price of visas that would erode the
prots of the smugglers on the China to the US route to be between $18; 000
and $50; 000 and this would lead to an increase in migration demand between
25% and 50%. Hence there is a trade-o¤ between suppressing smugglers or
having fewer migrants in the economy. So if the goal is to control migration,
demand is the lowest with a monopolistic smuggler. Increasing cartelisation
of the market through repression contributes to controlling migration ows.
However, such policy is not satisfactory either, as it favors the emergence of
a dominant criminal network.
The paper proposes instead to combine di¤erent types of repression mea-
sures with pricing tools to dismantle the smugglers while limiting the increase
in migration ows following the legalisation. Some calibrations highlight the
sensitivity of the magnitude of the policy implications to the level of risk
entailed by illegal migration, as well as the complementarity between the
di¤erent types of repression measures, which, in practice, target di¤erent
groups: the smugglers, the illegal migrants or the rms which employ them.
Since a policy mix using traditional instruments combined with innovat-
ing pricing tools would be a more cost-e¤ective means of eliminating smug-
glers while regulating migration, a question that remains largely open is why
this has not yet been implemented. Although answering this question is
beyond the scope of the paper, we may consider a few hypotheses that are
worth investigating in future work and other elds of social sciences. In
countries like France one immediate answer is that introducing such pricing
schemes in the eld of migration may be considered as unethical or violating
human rights.40 Their implementation would surely generate many compli-
cated issues such as the feasibility of pricing visas di¤erently depending on
the country of origin of the applicants or the duration of the permit. From
this viewpoint, it is, however, not clear that transparent pricing tools are
40Moreover, people may not be willing to trade a sacred value such as the right to immi-
grate for money -what psychologist Philip Tetlock (2007) refers to as a "taboo tradeo¤".
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less ethical than the existing policy of visa rationing, which creates "rents"
to the lucky applicants, generates important monetary hidden costs, such as
briberies, paid by all applicants, and feeds all kinds of illegal activities. A sec-
ond answer suggested by our results is that natives may prefer to have lowly
paid illegal immigrants rather than a larger number of legal workers, who
would enjoy a more complete set of rights. Moreover, although reinforcing
sanctions paid by employers of illegal migrants would be a more cost-e¤ective
way to combine legalisation with migration control than reinforcing border
controls, such policy would typically encounter strong resistance from pow-
erful lobbies. The status quo reects complex political-economy issues with
some people benetting more than others from lax enforcement. These con-
siderations may explain why, under current policies, a large number of illegal
migrants still bear the costs of being exploited in destination areas and face
the constant risk of being deported.
Our model focuses on one particular channel of illegal entry through the
services of smugglers, which applies very well to long haul migration. While
this makes the originality of the paper, which proposes a general set-up of
human smuggling markets, it also limits the interpretation of the policy im-
plications. If would-be migrants choose between di¤erent channels of entry,
as it is the case for the US-Mexico cross-border migrants or for migrants
overstaying student/visitor visas to work illegally in high wages countries,
we may expect spill-over e¤ects of the policies under studies, which we hope
to highlight in future research.
37
7 Acknowledgements
We are grateful for very useful discussions and comments to Michel Beine,
Michael Ben Gad, Michael Clemens, Slobodan Djajic, Christian Dustmann,
Giovanni Facchini, Guido Friebel, John Geanakoplos, David McKenzie, Dilip
Mookherjee, Hillel Rapoport, Imran Rasul and to participants of the CRETE,
TEMPO, NORFACE, AFD-EUDN, AFD-AIRD-Harvard, AFD-PSE confer-
ences and seminar participants at the IFS, PSE, ECARES, Graduate Insti-
tute, CREST, CREAM (UCL) and Universities of Oslo and Cyprus. This
paper is produced as part of the project TEmporary Migration, integration
and the role of POlicies (TEMPO), funded by the NORFACE research pro-
gramme on Migration in Europe - Social, Economic, Cultural and Policy
Dynamics.
8 References
Akee, Randall, 2010 "Who Leaves? Deciphering Immigrant Self-Selection
from a Developing Country" Economic Development and Cultural Change,
Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 323-344.
Angelucci Manuela, 2012. "U.S. Border Enforcement and the Net Inow
of Mexican Illegal Migration", Economic Development and Cultural Change,
vol. 60, issue 2, pp 311 - 357.
Aronowitz, A A, 2001. "Smuggling and Tra¢ cking in Human Beings: The
Phenomenon, The Markets that Drive It and the Organisations that Promote
It." European Journal of Criminal Policy and Research 9(2): 163-195.
Becker Gary, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach".
The Journal of Political Economy 76: 169217.
Becker Gary, 1992. "An Open Door for Immigrants the Auction",Wall
Street Journal, Oct 14, 1992.
Becker-Posner blog, 2005. "Comment on immigration policy" http://www.becker-
posner-blog.com/archives/2005/07/comment_on_immi.html.
38
Bertozzi , Stefano, 2009. " Europes Fight against Human Tra¢ cking" ,
Etudes Ifri, Paris.
Beine, Michel, Frédéric Docquier and Hillel Rapoport, 2007 "Measuring
International Skilled Migration: New Estimates Controlling for Age of Entry"
The World Bank Economic Review, vol 21, no 2, 249254.
Borger, Scott, 2011: "Self-selection and Liquidity Constraints in Di¤erent
Migration Cost Regimes" Mimeo.
Borjas, George J. 2003. The Labor Demand Curve is Downward Sloping:
Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market.Quarterly
Journal of Economics, Vol. 118(4) pp133574.
Camarota, Steven, 2012, "Immigrants in the United-States, A Prole of
Americas Foreign-Born Population", Center for Immigration Studies.
Chau, Nancy H, 2001. "Strategic Amnesty and Credible Immigration
Reform," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol.19(3),
p. 604-34.
Chin, Ko-lin and Sheldon Zhang, 2002 "Characteristics of Chinese Human
Smugglers: A Cross-national Study" Final Report NCJ 200607 to the the US
Department of Justice.
Chiquiar Daniel and Gordon H. Hanson, 2005. "International Migration,
Self-Selection, and the Distribution of Wages: Evidence from Mexico and the
United States," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press,
vol. 113(2), pages 239-281.
Clemens, Michael A., Claudio E. Montenegro and Lant Pritchett, 2008.
"The place premium : wage di¤erences for identical workers across the US
border," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4671, The World Bank.
Cobb-Clark, Deborah A., Shiellss, Clinton R., Lowell, B. Lindsay, 1995
"Immigration Reform: The E¤ects of Employer Sanctions and Legalisation
on Wages" Journal of Labor Economics 13, 472-498.
Deltas, George., Richard Sicotte and Peter Tomczak, 2008. "Passenger
Shipping Cartels and Their E¤ect on Trans-Atlantic Migration" Review of
39
Economics and Statistics 90:1, 119-133.
Djaji´c, Slobodan, 1999. "Dynamics of Immigration Control", Journal of
Population Economics, vol. 12, 45-61.
Djaji´c, Slobodan, 2011 "Some Essentials of a Workable Guest-Worker
Program" unpublished manuscript, Graduate Institute, Geneva.
Djaji´c Slobodan and Alexandra Vinogradova 2011 "Migrants in Debt"
Unpublished Mimeo, The Graduate Institute of International and Develop-
ment Studies, Geneva.
Donato, Katharine M., Jorge Durand and Douglas S. Massey, 1992. "Stem-
ming the tide? Assessing the deterrent e¤ects of the Immigration Reform and
Control Act", Demography, 29: 139-57.
Dustmann Christian and Tommaso Frattini, 2011 "Immigration : The
European Experience" LdA WP 326.
Epstein, Gil S. and AviWeiss, 2001. "A Theory of Immigration Amnesties",
CEPR Discussion Paper no. 2830.
Epstein Gil S. and Avi Weiss, 2002. "An Amnesty for Foreign Workers",
The Economic Quarterly, 49(1), 107-120.
Epstein, Gil S., Arye Hilmann and Avi Weiss, 1999. "Creating Illegal
Immigrants", Journal of Population Economics, vol. 12, 3-21.
Ethier, Wilfred J, 1986. "Illegal Immigration: The Host-Country Prob-
lem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol.
76(1), p. 56-71.
Facchini Giovanni and Cecilia Testa, 2011: "The rhetoric of closed bor-
ders: quotas, lax enforcement and illegal migration" CEPR Discussion Pa-
pers 8245.
Freeman Richard B., 2006. "People ows in globalization", Journal of
Economic Perspectives 20 (2): 145-170.
Freeman Richard.B. and Remco H. Oostendorp, 2000. Wages Around
the World: Pay Across Occupations and Countries,NBER working paper
no. 8058.
40
Friebel Guido and Sergei Guriev, 2006. "Smuggling Humans: A Theory
of Debt-nanced Migration," Journal of the European Economic Association,
vol. 4, n. 6, p. 1085-1111.
Futo F. and M. Jandl, 2007. "2006 Yearbook on Illegal Migration, Human
Smuggling and Tra¢ cking in Central and Eastern Europe. A Survey Analy-
sis of Border Management and Border Apprehension Data from 20 States."
ICMPD, Vienna.
Gathman, Christina 2008. "E¤ects of enforcement on illegal markets: Ev-
idence from migrant smuggling along the southwestern border" Journal of
Public Economics, Volume 92, Issues 10-11, 1926-1941.
Guerette, R T. and R. V. Clarke, 2005. "Border Enforcement, Orga-
nized Crime, and Deaths of Smuggled Migrants on the United States-Mexico
Border." European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 11(2): 159-174.
Hanson Gordon H. and Antonio Spilimbergo, 1999. "Illegal Immigra-
tion, Border Enforcement, and Relative Wages: Evidence from Apprehen-
sions at the U.S.-Mexico Border" The American Economic Review, vol 89(5),
p. 1337-1357.
Hanson Gordon H.,Robertson, R. and Antonio Spilimbergo, 2002. "Does
border enforcement protect US workers from illegal migration?" Review of
economics and statistics, 84(1), 73-92.
Hanson Gordon H., 2006. "Illegal migration from Mexico to the United
Sates" Journal of Economic Literature, 869-924.
Hanson Gordon H., 2007. "The Economic Logic of Illegal Immigration"
Special report for the council on foreign relations, CSR NO. 26.
Hatton Timothy J. and Je¤rey G. Williamson, 2008. "Global Migration
and the World Economy: Two Centuries of Policy and Performance," MIT
Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582775, June.
IND (Immigration and Nationality Directorate), 2001 : "Secure Borders,
Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern Britain". Home O¢ ce,
Croydon.
41
INS ,1998a. "U.S. Dismantles Largest Global Alien Smuggling Cartel
Encountered to Date", Press release, November 20, Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service,Washington, DC.
INS 1998b. "U.S. Cripples Major International Chinese Alien Smuggling
Operation", Press Release December 10, Immigration and Naturalization
Service, Washington, DC.
Karlson, Stephen H. and Eliakim Katz, 2003. "A positive theory of im-
migration amnesties" Economics Letters, Volume 78, Issue 2, 231-239.
Kossoudji, Sherrie and Deborah Cobb-Clark, 2002. "Coming Out of the
Shadows:Learning about Legal Status and Wages from the Legalized Popu-
lation", Journal of Labor Economics, vol. 20, no. 3, 598-628.
Kwong, Peter, 1997. "Forbidden Workers: Illegal Chinese Immigrants
and American Labor" (New York: The New Press).
Lundgren, Ted, 2008. "People smuggling syndicates: An oligopoly analy-
sis in the context of the Söderköping process, Revista: Studii Economice,
Vol. 2, Nos. 3-4, pp. 33-39.
Maas, Willem, 2009. "Unauthorized Migration and the Politics of Le-
galization, Regularization, and Amnesty in Europe" Paper presented at the
annual meeting of the Western Political ScienceAssociation conference held
in Vancouver.
Mahmoud, Omar T. and Christoph Trebesch, 2010. "The Economics
of Human Tra¢ cking and Labor Migration: Micro-Evidence from Eastern
Europe" Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol.38, no2, p.173188.
Miron, Je¤rey A, 2003. " The E¤ect of Drug Prohibition on Drug Prices:
Evidence from the Markets for Cocaine and Heroin" The Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, Vol. 85, No. 3, 522-530.
Miron, Je¤rey A and Zwiebel, Je¤rey, 1991. "Alcohol Consumption dur-
ing Prohibition," American Economic Review, American Economic Associa-
tion, vol. 81(2), 242-47.
Massey, Douglas S. and Kristin E. Espinosa, C. 1997. "Whats driving
42
Mexico-US migration? A theoretical, empirical and policy analysis", Ameri-
can Journal of Sociology, 102, 939-99.
Moraga, Jesus Fernandez-Huertas and Rapoport, Hillel, 2013. "Tradable
Immigration Quotas". CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4087.
New York Times, 2000a. "Chinese Towns Main Export: Its Young Men",
June 26.
New York Times 2000b. "Immigrant Smugglers, Too, Can Need a Lawyers
Help", Sep 23.
Orrenius Pia M. and Madeline Zavodny, 2010. "Beside the Golden Door
U.S. Immigration Reform in a New Era of Globalization" AEI Press.
Orrenius, Pia M. and Madeline Zavodny, 2005 "Self-Selection Among
Undocumented Immigrants fromMexico" Journal of Development Economics
78, 215240.
Padgett, Tim 2003."People Smugglers Inc". Time Magazine, August 12.
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,474582,00.html.
Poulin, Richard, 2005. "The legalization of prostitution and its impact on
tra¢ cking in women and children" http://sisyphe.org/article.php3?id_article=1596.
Poret, Sylvaine, 2002, "Paradoxical E¤ects of Law Enforcement Policies:
The Case of the Illicit Drug Market, International Review of Law and Eco-
nomics, vol. 22 n 4, 2002, 465 - 493.
Rivera-Batiz, Francisco, 1999. "Undocumented Workers in the Labor
Market: An Analysis of the Earnings of Legal and Illegal Mexican Immigrants
in the United States", Journal of Population Economics, vol. 12, 91-116.
Rivera-Batiz, Francisco, 2004, "Undocumented workers in the labor mar-
ket: An analysis of the earnings of legal and illegal Mexican immigrants in
the United States", Population Economics, pp 307-332
Roberts, Bryan; Gordon Hanson, Derekh Cornwell, and Scott Borger,
2010 "An Analysis of Migrant Smuggling Costs along the Southwest Border"
O¢ ce of Immigration Statistics POLICY DIRECTORATE, Working Paper.
Saint Paul, Gilles, 2009 : "Immigration, qualications et marché du
43
travail" La Documentation française. Rapport pour le Conseil dAnalyse
Économique, Paris, 2009.
Schi¤ Maurice, 2011: "Temporary Migration, Overstaying and Optimal
Short-Run and Long-Run Immigration Policy" mimeo, the Workld Bank.
Simon Julian, 1989. "The Economic Consequences of Immigration into
the United States" Chapter 16 The University of Michigan Press.
Solano-García Ángel, 2009. "A positive theory of immigration amnesties.
A comment", Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), 117-117.
Tamura Yuji, 2010: "Human Smuggling" Journal of Public Economics,
vol.94, Issues 7-8, 540-548.
Tamura Yuji, 2013: "Migrant smuggling when exploitation is private in-
formation", forthcoming in Canadian Journal of Economics.
Tetlock, Philip E., 1999: "Coping with trade-o¤s: Psychological con-
straints and political implications". In S. Lupia, M. McCubbins, & S. Pop-
kin (eds.), Political reasoning and choice. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
UNODC, 2012, "UNODCs Comprehensive Strategy to Combat Tra¢ ck-
ing in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants", publication by the United Nation
On Crime and Drugs, 29 February 2012.
Vinogradova Alexandra, 2010 "Deportation or Voluntary Return ?" un-
published manuscript, Center of Economic Research CER-ETH, Zurich.
Woodland, Alan D. and Chisato Yoshida, 2006. "Risk preference, immi-
gration policy and illegal immigration," Journal of Development Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pp 500-513.
Yun, Gao and Veronique Poisson, 2005 "Le trac et lexploitation des im-
migrants chinois en France" Genève, Bureau international du Travail, ISBN
92-2-217070-9 (printed draft); ISBN 92-2-217071-7.
44
Appendix
Appendix A: Market Equilibrium and an illustration in the case
of uniform distribution
We model the oligopolistic market for illegal migration as a generalized
Cournot competition. We focus on symmetric equilibrium (i.e., each smuggler
has the same market share). Let P I(Q) = (dwf   wh)F 1(1   Q) denote
the inverse demand function for illegal migration. Smuggler j = 1; ::; N
maximises with respect to quantity Qj the prot function:
j(Qj; Q j) =

P I(Qj +Q j)  cQj
where Q j =
P
k 6=j Q
k is the o¤er made by the competitors of j = 1; :::; N .
The rst order condition is su¢ cient under the assumption that the demand
function is not too convex. In a symmetric equilibrium Qj = Q
N
and the
generalized Cournot price with N smugglers, pN , is such that (3) holds.
We next illustrate the market equilibrium with the example of a uni-
form distribution of skills over [0; 1], which gives easily tractable closed form
solutions. From (1) and (2) we can write explicitly the demand for illegal
migration as:
DI(p) = 1  p
dwf   wh (24)
In the case of a generalized Cournot competition, we can use (3) to establish
that the price is as follows:
pN =
dwf   wh +Nc
N + 1
(25)
such that pm(= p1) = dwf wh
2
+ c
2
and p1(= limN!+1 pN) = c.
We deduce that the generalized Cournot demand is
DI(pN) =
N
N + 1

1  c
dwf   wh

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Depending on the degree of competitiveness of the market, measured by
N , the demand is between the demand on monopolistic market DI(pm) =
1
2
  c
2(dwf wh) ; and the demand in perfect competition D
I(c) = 2DI(pm).
Appendix B : Proof of dp
I(pL)
dpL
> 0
To show that dp
I(pL)
dpL
> 0 we totally di¤erentiate (3) where the direct price
elasticity of demand, which is derived from (6), is parameterized by pL.
We obtain that
dpI(pL)
dpL
=   (p
I   c)@2DI(pI ;pL)
@pI@pL
+ 1
N
@DI(pI ;pL)
@pL
N+1
N
@DI(pI ;pL)
@pI
+ (pI   c)@2DI(pI ;pL)
@pI2
(26)
Second order condition of the oligopoly optimization problem implies that
the denominator is negative. Since the two commodities are substitutes (i.e.,
@DI
@pL
 0), a su¢ cient condition for the numerator to be positive is that
@2DI(pI ;pL)
@pI@pL
> 0. Using equation (6) we can easily show that this is always
true as long as f 0()  0, which characterises for example the case with a
uniform distribution (f 0() = 0 over the support). By virtue of equation
(27) below with a uniform distribution we get @
2DI(pI ;pL)
@pI@pL
= 0. It is also true
when the density function is strictly decreasing as in developing countries
where the vast majority of people do not have any education and are thus
low skilled. QED
Appendix C: Uniform Distribution Example for Proposition 2
This section develops Proposition 2 in the case of a uniform distribution
of skills distributed over 0 and 1. The demand faced by the smugglers when
the government proposes a (legal) migration price, pL, is:
DI(pI ; pL) =
Z pL pI
(1 d)wf
pI
dwf wh
f()d =
Z pL pI
(1 d)wf
pI
dwf wh
d =
pL   pI
(1  d)wf  
pI
dwf   wh (27)
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We deduce that the inverse demand function faced by the smugglers is:
P I(Q; pL) =
dwf   wh
wf   wh (p
L   (1  d)wfQ) (28)
Smuggler j = 1; ::; N maximises with respect to qj the prot function:
j(qj; Q j) =

P I(qj +Q j; pL)  c qj
where c represents the marginal costs for the smuggler and Q j =
P
k 6=j q
k is
the o¤er made by the competitors of j = 1; :::; N . In a symmetric equilibrium
qj = Q
N
so that the Cournot quantity QN is such that:
P I(QN ; pL)  c+ @P
I(QN ; pL)
@QN
QN
N
= 0 (29)
Symmetrically the generalized Cournot price with N smugglers, pN , is such
that:
pN   c
pN
=
1
N
1
"DI ;pI
(30)
Second order condition requires that
@2P I(Q; pL)
@Q2
Q
N
+ 2
@P I(Q; pL)
@Q
 0 (31)
which is always true with the uniform distribution example (see (28)).
Substituting (28) in the equation (29) we deduce that
QN(pL) =
N
N + 1
(pL   c wf   wh
dwf   wh )
1
(1  d)wf (32)
or, alternatively, that
PN(pL) = P I(QN(pL); pL) =
pL
N + 1
dwf   wh
wf   wh +
N
1 +N
c (33)
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We now turn to showing that such reaction smugglers price is smaller than
the price imposed by the smugglers under unconstrained oligopoly. With the
uniform distribution example, replacing (33) into (10) the upper limit for the
visa price satises:
pL = [Nc+ (1 +N)(1  d)wf ] wf   wh
(1  d)wf +N(wf   wh) (34)
Comparing the reaction smugglers price pI(pL) with the unconstrained smug-
glersoligopoly price pN = dwf wh+Nc
N+1
dened in (25) it is straightforward to
check that pI(pL)  pN if and only if dwf   wh  c, which is a necessary
condition for the smugglers to be active in the rst place. Indeed from (1),
we obtain that: dwf   wh > pI otherwise there is no illegal migrant. More-
over, necessarily c < pI otherwise smugglers do not operate. Therefore, when
smugglers operate, the condition c < dwf  wh is necessarily satised, which
implies that pI(pL) < p
N : QED
Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 3
Let pL(R1; R2) =
wf wh
d(R2)wf wh c(R1) be the price which pushes smugglers
out of business and let DL(R1; R2) = 1  F

pL(R1;R2)
wf wh

the legal demand for
visas associated with this price. The problem (14) the government aims to
solve is equivalent to:
max
R1;R2
pL(R1; R2) s.t. R1 +R2  DL(R1; R2)pL(R1; R2) (35)
The Lagrangian of this optimization problem is :
L = pL(R1; R2) + 
n
DL(R1; R2)p
L(R1; R2)  (R1 +R2)
o
(36)
The Lagrangian derivatives are for k = 1; 2 :
@L
@Rk
=
@pL
@Rk

1 + DL(R1; R2)

+ pL(R1; R2)
@DL
@Rk
   (37)
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Focusing on interior solutions, the optimal combination of (R1; R2) satises
necessarily @L
@R1
= @L
@R2
, which yields:
@pL
@R2

1 + DL(R1; R2)

+ pL(R1; R2)
@DL
@R2
=
@pL
@R1

1 + DL(R1; R2)

+ pL(R1; R2)
@DL
@R1
Simplifying this expression by noting that @D
L
@Rk
=  
@pL
@Rk
wf whf

pL(R1;R2)
wf wh

, the
optimal combinaison of (R1; R2) is such that
@pL
@R1
=
@pL
@R2
, which yields equation
(16). The Lagrangian derivative with respect to  yields equation (15). We
now check with a simple example that the set of functions supporting an
interior solution is not empty.
An example:
Lets assume that wh ' 0 and that c(R) = c1+2R1+R and d(R) = d1+R .
Consistently with the model assumptions c(R) is increasing and concave and
d(R) is decreasing and convex. Lets note k(R) = c
0(R)
c(R)
= 1
(1+R)(1+2R)
and let
g(R) =  d
0(R R)
d(R R) =
1
1+R R for all R 2 [0; R] with R being a xed point such
that R = DL(R;R   R)pL(R;R   R). The interior solution of our problem
is determined by that: k(R) = g(R).41
R2(R) = R R1(R) = R + 1 
s
1 +
R
2
(38)
It is easy to check that both R1(R) and R

2(R) take their value between [0; R].
They constitute an interior solution of the optimisation problem.
Let pL(R) = pL(R1(R); R

2(R)) and D
L(R) = DL(R1(R); R

2(R)). To
complete the proof we need to show that there exists a xed point, R > 0,
such that R = DL(R)pL(R).
41It is easy to check that k0(R) < 0 and that g0(R) > 0 8R 2 [0; R]. Since k(R) is
strictly decreasing and g(R) is strictly increasing for all R 2 [0; R], and since g(0) < k(0);
and g(R) > k(R) 8R > 0, there exists an unique interior solution to k(R) = g(R).
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The assumption wh ' 0 implies that pL(R) = c(R

1)
d(R2)
= c
d
1+2R1
1+R1
(1 + R2).
Substituting R1 and R

2 by their value from (38) and rearranging the expres-
sion we get
pL(R) =
c
d
q
2(2 +R)  1
2
(39)
We deduce that R is the solution to:
R =
c
d
 p
2(2 +R)  121  c
dwf
 p
2(2 +R)  12 (40)
The demand is dened if 1  c
dwf
 p
2(2 +R)  12 , which is equivalent to
R  Rmax = 0:5

1 +
q
dwf
c
2
  2. We deduce that Rmax > 0 if and only if
dwf
c
> 1 (41)
Note that this assumption is always veried whenever there is some human
smuggling: c < dwf. Therefore Rmax > 0 and it is straightforward to
check that R exists. Indeed when R = 0 the left hand side of equation (40)
is equal to LHS(0) = 0, while the right hand side is equal to RHS(0) =
c
d

1  c
dwf

> 0 under (41). Symmetrically the left hand side of equation
(40) when R = Rmax is equal to LHS(Rmax) = Rmax > 0 under (41), while
RHS(Rmax) = 0. Since both functions are continuous they cross necessarily
at least once at R 2 (0; Rmax).
Moreover, after noting that:
RHS 0(R) = 2
c
d
"p
2(2 +R)  1p
2(2 +R)
#
1  c
dwf
2(
p
2(2 +R)  1)2

we can check that RHS 0(R) < 0, dwf < 2c(
p
2(2 +R)  1)2; which is for
instance true if 2 > dwf
c
> 1. In this case the function LHS(:) is increasing
and RHS(:) is decreasing: they cross only once. QED
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Appendix E: Risk aversion
Proof of Lemma 1
Applying the expected utility theorem and comparing the individuals
expected utility in case he/she migrates, equal to (1  q)u(wf   pI) +
qu
 
wh   pI

with the expected utility in case she does not migrate, equal to
u (wh), we can write the migration condition as: u (wh) < (1  q)u(wf  
pI) + qu
 
wh   pI

. Studying the threshold such that an individual is just
indi¤erent between migrating illegally or not migrating, the marginal type
Ira is the solution of the following equation: u (wh) = (1   q)u(wf  
pI) + qu
 
wh   pI

. Substituting u(x) = 1  exp( ax) and rearranging this
expression, we obtain the illegal migration threshold Ira as a solution of the
equation (18): 1 e
 apI
1 e a(wf wh) = 1  q.
Let () = 1 e
 apI
1 e a(wf wh) . Deriving twice the function () one can easily
check that it is decreasing and convex in . Moreover lim!0 () = +1 and
lim!1 () = 1   e apI . We deduce, rst, that if q is strictly lower than
e ap
I
then Ira exists and is unique and, second, that 
I
ra is increasing with q.
We can write the demand for illegal migration as a function of the migra-
tion price pI similarly as before, except that I is now replaced by Ira:
DIra(p
I) =
Z 
Ira
f()d = 1  F (Ira) (42)
As Ira increases with p
I and decreases with , the demand for migration
remains higher the lower the migration price, pI , and the higher the wage
di¤erential wf   wh between the two countries. The logic of the pricing
scheme of smugglers described in section 2 remains thus the same as before
but it takes into account the new (lower) demand from risk averse individuals
(42).
We now formally show in the uniform example that risk aversion implies
that the price imposed by smugglers is then lower than the price they would
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impose to risk neutral individuals with the same expected revenue from mi-
gration With risk neutrality we have I(p) = p
dwf wh and
DI(p) =
Z 1
I
f()d = 1  F (I) = 1  I(p) (43)
We deduce that the (absolute value) of the price elasticity of demand is:
"
D;p
=
 DI0(p)p
DI(p)
=
I(p)
1  I(p) =
p
(dwf   wh)  p
With risk aversion, we have Ira which is such that:
1  e ap
1  e a(wf wh) = 1  q (44)
We deduce that :
Ira(p) =
log(1  q)  log (e ap   q))
a(wf   wh) (45)
the demand is:
DIra(p) =
Z 1
Ira
f()d = 1  F (Ira) = 1  Ira(p) (46)
It is straightforward to check that if q = 0 (i.e., there is no risk of deportation
in migrating illegally) then  = d so that Ira(p) = 
I(p).
We deduce that the (absolute value) of the price elasticity of demand is:
"
Dra;p
=
 DI0ra(p)p
DIra(p)
=
p e
 ap
e ap q
(wf   wh)  log(1 q) log(e ap q))a
(47)
Here again it is easy to check that "
Dra;p
= "
D;p
when q = 0. After di¤eren-
tiating "
Dra;p
with respect to q  1 and noting that a(wf   wh)   log(1  
q) + log(e ap   q) > 0 as 0 < Ira(p) < 1 one can check that "Dra;p increases
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with q:
d"
Dra;p
dq


a(wf  wh)  log(1  q)+ log
 
e ap   q) + 1  e ap
1  q > 0 (48)
So when the risk q augments the demand price elasticity increases, and thus,
everything else being equal, the monopoly price is lower.QED
Proof of Lemma 2
We now turn to the government policy of visa sale and the reaction of
smugglers. If individuals can buy a legal permit to migrate at price pL,
smugglers need to price their services low enough so that at least one indi-
vidual wishes to migrate illegally. The skill level Lra of the marginal illegal
migrant who is just indi¤erent between migrating illegally and legally sat-
ises u
 
wf   pL

= (1   q)u(wf   pI) + qu
 
wh   pI

. Substituting
u(x) = 1   exp( ax) and rearranging this expression, we obtain the legal
migration threshold Lra as a solution of the following equation:
1  e a((wf wh)+pI pL)
1  e a(wf wh) = 1  q (49)
Solving for the threshold Lra and comparing it to (4) we show in the following
that Lra < 
L:
Proof. Let () = 1 e
 a((wf wh)+pI pL)
1 e a(wf wh) . Equation (49)denes 
L
ra as a solu-
tion of () = 1   q. The benchmark case of risk neutrality is obtained by
setting q = 0 in this equation. Indeed when q = 0 and  = d the unique
solution of () = 1 is L dened equation (4). This also implies that the
function () crosses once and only once the horizontal line 1.
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Next, deriving () with respect to  yields:
0() =
a(1  e a((wf wh)+pI pL))
1  e a(wf wh) (
(wf   wh)e a((wf wh)+pI pL)
1  e a((wf wh)+pI pL)  
(wf   wh)e a(wf wh)
1  e a(wf wh)
)
To study the sign of 0() we consider 2 cases:
 If   pL pI
wf wh then (wf wh)+pI pL  0 so that 1 e a((wf wh)+p
I pL) 
0. Since by assumption wf  wh  wf  wh  0 all the other elements
in the fractions composing 0() are positive. We deduce that both the
rst term and the term in the brackets are negative such that 0() > 0.
 If pL pI
wf wh <  
pL pI
(1 )wf = 
L then 0 < (wf wh)+pI pL  (wf wh)
and 1   e a((wf wh)+pI pL) > 0. Since 1   e ax is log concave in x,
we have that e
 a((wf wh)+pI pL)
1 e a((wf wh)+pI pL)
 e a(wf wh)
1 e a(wf wh) . Moreover we have
wf   wh  wf   wh  0 such that the term in the brackets is now
positive. Similarly the rst term is also now positive such that 0() >
0.
We have just shown that the continuous function () is increasing for
 2 [0; L]. Moreover it crosses once and only once the horizontal line at
q = 0 for  = L. We deduce that for  > L () > 1 so that equation
(49) never holds. The relevant domain for Lra in equation (49) when q varies
between 0 and 1 is  2 [0; L]. This implies that if Lra exists it is necessarily
such that Lra  L with a strict inequality for any q > 0.
To nish the proof of Lemma 2 we need to show that Lra exists and is
unique. It is done by noting that lim!0 () =  1. So the function ()
strictly increases between  1 and 1 when  varies between 0 and L. It
necessarily crosses the line q 2 [0; 1] once and only once.QED
Proof of Lemma 3
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In order to eradicate the smugglers we know that
Ira(c) = 
L
ra(c; p
L
ra
) (50)
with Ira(c) =
log(1 q) log(e ca q)
a(wf wh)
Moreover, from (18) Lra(c; p
L
ra
) is the implicit solution of
1  q = 1  e
 a((wf wh)+c pLra)
1  e a(wf wh)
This implies that pL
ra
satises the following equation
(1  q) (1  e a(wf wh)) = 1  e a((wf wh)+c pLra)
with  = Ira(c) =
log(1  q)  log (e ca   q))
a(wf   wh)
This yields successively that:
c = Ira(c)(wf   wh) + c  pLra
pL
ra
=
log(1  q)  log (e ca   q))
a(wf   wh) (wf   wh) (51)
and we can check easily that dpL
ra
=dq > 0:QED
The reasoning of section 3.2.2 remains valid under risk aversion. The IR
constraint, which can be written 1  e a(wf pL)  1  e awh, is unchanged.
The IC constraint becomes 1 e a(wf pL)  (1  q) (1 e a(wf pI))+q(1 
e a(wh p
I)). The IC constraint is binding if (1  q) (1  e a(wf pI))+ q(1 
e a(wh p
I))  1  e awh, which is a necessary condition for the smuggler to
be active. So if the smuggler is active the binding constraint is the IC and
pLra is the solution of the following equation:
e a(wf p
L) = (1  q) e a(wf pIra(pL)) + qe a(wh pIra(pL))
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Proof of Proposition 4
Using three instruments to eradicate human smuggling while controlling
migration ows, the government solves :
max
R1;R2;R3
pL(R1; R2; R3) s.t. R1+R2+R3  DL(R1; R2; R3)pL(R1; R2; R3)
(52)
The Lagrangian of this optimization problem is :
L = pL(R1; R2; R3)+
n
DL(R1; R2; R3)p
L(R1; R2; R3) (R1+R2+R3)
o
(53)
The Lagrangian derivatives are for k = 1; 2; 3 :
@L
@Rk
=
@pL
@Rk

1 + DL(R1; R2)

+ pL(R1; R2)
@DL
@Rk
   (54)
Focusing on interior solutions, the optimal combination of (R1; R2; R3) satis-
es necessarily: @L
@R1
= @L
@R2
= @L
@R3
. Simplifying this expression by noting that
@DL
@Rk
=  
@pL
@Rk
wf whf

pL(R1;R2;R3)
wf wh

yields that the optimal combination is such
that
@pL
@R1
=
@pL
@R2
=
@pL
@R3
, which yields equation (23). Moreover the Lagrangian
derivative with respect to  yields equation (21).QED
Link with Becker (1968)
Assuming to simplify that wh = 0 we can determine the investments
such that expected earnings from illegal migration, (1   q(R3))(R2)wf +
q(R3)wh = (1   q(R3))(R2)wf , are minimized under the budget constraint
R2 +R3 = R. As R2 = R R3, R3 is the solution to:
 0(R R3)
(R R3)
=
q0(R3)
1  q(R3) (55)
Under the assumption that the functions 1  q(R) and (R) are log convex,
which is for instance the case when q(R) = 1   q=(1 + R) and (R) =
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=(1 + R), the function f(R) = q
0(R)
1 q(R) decreases with R and the function
g(R) =  
0(R R)
(R R) increases with R. Under the assumption that f(0) > g(0)
and f(R) < g(R) then Rrn3 solution of (55) exists and is unique. When for
instance q(R) = 1  q=(1+R) and (R) = =(1+R) then g(R) = 1
1+R R and
f(R) = 1
1+R
. This implies f(0) = 1 > g(0) = 1
1+R
and f(R) = 1
1+R
< g(R) =
1 so that Rrn3 = R=2. This determines the optimal allocation of investment
between the two instruments to reduce migration ows under the assumption
of risk neutrality.
However, if individuals are risk-averse, minimizing the ow of migrants is
not equivalent to minimising expected earnings of would be migrants. Using
our model, minimizing the ow of migrants is equivalent to maximizing the
price of visas, which can be written as pL
ra
(R3) =
log(1 q(R3)) log(e ca q(R3))
a(R R3)wf (wf 
wh):
Assuming again to simplify thatwh = 0, we can rewrite the price pLra(R3) =
log(1 q(R3)) log(e ca q(R3))
a(R R3) and maximise it with respect to R3 with the con-
straint that R3 +R2 = R:
We nd that
@pL
ra
=@R3 =
1
a(R R3)

q0(R3)
1  q(R3)

1  q(R3)
e ca   q(R3)   1

+
0(R R3)
(R R3)

log (1  q(R3))  log(e ca   q(R3))

Under risk aversion an interior solution of our problem is such that @pL
ra
=@R3 =
0, which determines implicitly the optimal investment Rra3 as solution of the
following equation:
 0(R R3)
(R R3)
=
q0(R3)
1  q(R3)
1 q(R3)
e ca q(R3)   1
log(1  q(R3)  log (e ca   q(R3)) (56)
By comparing (55) and (56) it is easy to see that the investment to increase
the probability of deportation is higher under risk aversion than under risk
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neutrality: Rra3 > R
rn
3 . Indeed, since f(R) =
q0(R)
1 q(R) decreases and g(R) =
 0(R R)
(R R) increases with R, R
ra
3 > R
rn
3 if the function f(R) is shifted to the
right (i.e., if it increases). This depends on the distortion in (56) being greater
than 1, which is equivalent to:
1  q(R3)
e ca   q(R3)   1 > log

1  q(R3)
e ca   q(R3)

(57)
Since 1 q(R3)
e ca q(R3) > 1 this is always true (i.e., x   logx   1 > 0 8x > 1). We
have thus established that q(Rrn3 ) is lower than the probability of deportation
q(Rra3 ), which minimises migration ows.QED
Appendix F : Rationality of migration decisions
This Appendix departs from the estimated prices paid by Chinese illegal
migrants to go to the US, which have been documented in Friebel and Guriev,
2006 and previous work to be above $35000 in mid 1990s and then continued
to rise and checks that the rationality constraint of our model is satised for
the wage di¤erential between the US and China observed in 2005 and for a
large range of wage di¤erentials observed between advanced and developing
countries..
To calibrate d, we use Cobb-Clark and Kossoudjis (2002) estimates of
14 to 24% legalisation premia which, we round at 20%. Assuming d = 0:8
is also in line with the ndings of Rivera-Batiz (1999) on the gap in wage
di¤erential between legal and undocumented immigrants on the US market,
which remains unexplained by di¤erences in measured characteristics of these
two groups.42
To calculate the net present value of working illegally in the US we follow
Friebel and Guriev, 2006, and take the average minimum wages in the US,
42Although these estimates are based on Mexican immigrants and may be di¤erent for
long-distance illegal migrants, who may come from very di¤erent areas such as South
East Asia, Russia or Africa and may have di¤erent skill distributions, these are, to our
knowledge, the best available proxies.
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$6:15 per hour, and assume that a migrant works 45 hours for 52 weeks
per year over a period of 40 years. Accordingly, assuming the discount and
growth rates of future wages are equal and without loss of generality setting
it to zero, NPV of earnings in the US is around $575640 (= 5245$6:1540)
Moreover, estimates of the GDP per capita in China in terms of purchasing
power parity are in the range of $4000 such that, over 40 years, the NPV
of earnings in China are estimated around $160000 (= $4000  40).43 We
can check that the IR constraint, pI  (dwf   wh); is largely satised (as
pI < 575640  0:8  160000) for the case of the Chinese migration to the US.
More generally, we check that the constraint pI  wh(dwfwh   1) is easily
satised for a large range of ratios wf
wh
(=2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 15, and 25) based
on wage di¤erentials between advanced and developing countries reported
by Freeman et al. (2000) or on purchasing power adjusted wages ratios
computed by Clemens et al. (2009) for workers who are otherwise observably
identical. However, since we do not have good estimates for the prices to cross
illegally from one origin to another destination country, we prefer to focus on
the illegal Chinese migration to the US for the remainder of our simulations.
Appendix G : Risk aversion and probability of deportation
From the Cournot Price (3) and replacing the price elasticity of the de-
mand for migration "
Dra;p
using our calculations above (47) we can write the
marginal costs for smugglers to operate, cra, as follows:
cra = p
I   1
N
(wf   wh) 
log(1 q) log

e ap
I q

a
e apI
e apI q
(58)
Replacing in (58) with pI = 35000,  = 0:8, wf = 575640, wh = 160000,
43This estimate of GDP per capita reported by the CIA World Factbook 2005 corre-
sponds to a wage equal to 1.7 dollar per hour in China, which, given the adjustment by the
di¤erential in purchasing power between China and the US, does not seem unreasonable.
See https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
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N = 2, and cra = 10000 we can determine a set of absolute risk aversion
parameters a, which correspond to a set of deportation probabilities q.
To illustrate the magnitude of the policy implications of the model, we
present our results for four sets of compatible values (0:7; 0:00000086), (0:5; 0:00001),
(0:4; 0:00002), (0:2; 0:000039).
Appendix H : Policy Simulations
Price of visas and migration demand following a "pure sale of
visas" scheme
This Appendix estimates the increase in migration demand following a
"pure" sale of visas implemented to eliminate smugglers (i.e. not using the
other available instruments, such that marginal costs for smugglers to op-
erate, sanctions against employers and probability of deportation remain
unchanged).
We rst simulate the visa price that would eradicate the smugglers using
equation (51). Consistent with Lemma 3, row 3 of Table I shows that, for each
degree of risk aversion a considered successively in columns (1) to (4), the
price increases with the risk of deportation. In column (1) this price ranges
between $43624 and $49954 for probabilities of deportation, q; between 0:68
and 0:72. In column (4), the visa price ranges between $17755 and $18957
for probabilities of deportation between 0:18 and 0:22. A relatively high a
coupled with a low q leads to much smaller equilibrium visa prices than a
relatively low a coupled with a high q. In other words the visa price is very
sensitive to the risk entailed by illegal migration.
We then estimate the magnitude of the increase in demand resulting from
this "pure sale of visas" scheme, D =
DLra(p
L
ra
) DIra(pI)
DIra(p
I)
, which depends on the
distribution of migrantsskills.
Assuming a uniform distribution over [0; 1] the demand for illegal migra-
tion before the policy is implemented is: DIra(p
I) = 1  Ira; with Ira solution
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of the equation (18), such that:
DIra(p
I) = 1 
log(1  q)  log

e ap
I   q

a(wf   wh) (59)
whereas, following the policy, the demand becomes
DLra(p
L
ra
) = 1  log(1  q)  log (e
 ac   q))
a(wf   wh) (60)
For the values (a; q) discussed above we can simulate the relative increase in
migration demand following the policy as follows:
D =
DLra(p
L
ra
) DIra(pI)
DIra(p
I)
=
log (e ca   q)  log

e ap
I   q

a(wf   wh)  log(1  q) + log
 
e apI   q
Our results presented in Table 1 show that the jump in demand following the
"pure sale of visas" policy increases with the initial risk of deportation q. It
varies between around 20% for low values (q = 0:18) and 55% for high values
(q = 0:72), as displayed in Row 4 of the table. Finally, Tables J1 and J2 in
the Appendix I report the simulations for N = 3 and N = 5 and show, in line
with the model, that the less competitive the smugglersmarket the larger
the relative increase in demand, D; following the policy: indeed, strongly
cartelised smugglers keep the demand for illegal migration at a low level
with high prices charged to migrants. Accordingly, our simulations assuming
N = 2 give higher bounds for all implied changes.44
Sale of visas with migration control policy using reinforced bor-
der controls : c(R)
To keep the migration demand una¤ected by the sale of visas, policy
44We can also use simulations to show that the values of risk compatible with N = 10
would imply that q is lower than 0:05. This makes this case not very plausible for the
China to US route under study.
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makers may rst consider reinforcing border controls, which would increase
marginal costs for smugglers to operate.
After replacing (59) and (60) in DIra(p
I) = DL

pL
ra
(R)

we nd that
c(R) must satisfy the following equation:
log(1  q)  log

e ap
I   q

a(wf   wh) =
log(1  q)  log  e ac(R)   q)
a(wf   wh)
which is equivalent to pI = c(R):
As c(:) increases with R, this determines a unique level of repression
above which the policy of sale of visas with repression brings a lower level of
migration than under the status quo. To give an idea of the magnitude of
the required e¤orts we can compare the level of marginal costs for smugglers
to operate, which must be equal to $35000 following the policy, to the actual
marginal costs for Chinese smugglers reported to be around $10000. There-
fore the policy would require increasing the marginal costs for smugglers by
250% (i.e.c = c(R
) c
c
= 2:5 such that c(R) = 3:5c). As it seems reasonable
to assume decreasing returns to scale for border enforcement measures this
would require increasing by more than 3,5 times the budget allocated to such
measures.
Sale of visas with migration control policy using reinforced sanc-
tions to employers : (R)
To keep the migration demand una¤ected by the sale of visas, policy mak-
ers could alternatively reinforce the sanctions to employers of undocumented
employees, which would translate into lower expected earnings abroad for
illegal migrants. We determine the discounting factor, (R), which yields
the same level of migration following the policy as under the status quo.
Solving DIra(p
I) = DL

pL
ra
(R)

yields (R) as an implicit solution of
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the following equation:
(R)wf   wh
wf   wh =
log( 1 q
e ac q )
log( 1 q
e apI q )
(61)
Row 6 of Table I shows that this policy would require decreasing the
discount factor  by around 50% (i.e. = (R
) 

=  0:5), such that the
earnings of workers employed in the illegal sector of the economy falls below
40% of those of same skill workers in the legal sector.
Appendix I : Sensitivity analysis when the number of smugglers
on the market varies
First we can check that the observations of a large di¤erential between the
migration price charged by smugglers (i.e., p = 35000) and the marginal cost
(i.e., c = 10000) is not compatible with a relatively competitive market. The
large markup suggests a cartelized smuggling market. For instance assuming
N = 10 or above would imply, using equation (58), that deportation risk is
below 0:05 which is not very realistic.
For our simulations above we assumed that N = 2: We now turn to
testing the sensitivity of our results when the market for smugglers is more
competitive, assuming successively N = 3 and N = 5 smugglersnetworks.
Simulations presented in the tables J1 and J2 show the magnitude of all
implied changes. Note that, similarly as above, the degrees of risk aversion
and deportation probabilities displayed in the rst two rows of each table
have been chosen to be compatible with the information c = 10000 and
p = 35000, characterising the market for Chinese smuggled migrants.
Appendix J : The case of negative selection
Since our main focus is to design a policy to eliminate smugglers, which
are primarily used in long haul migration, we assumed in the presentation
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of the model that workers self-select positively through migration accord-
ing to their skill level. This generates interesting ndings as a government
will compete with smugglers to attract the highest skilled of the candidates
for illegal migration by selling migration visas. However, depending on the
relative returns to skill in the origin and destination countries the case of
negative self-selection of workers through illegal migration cannot be ruled
out, in particular for low-costs cross-border migration.
To give the intuition of how the results would change in the case of neg-
ative selection, we adopt the extreme assumption that workers working in
the illegal sector of the destination country are paid at a at rate, dwf
which does not depend on their skill. After writing the migration condition
as wh < dwf   pI ; we can solve for the skill threshold, denoted I ; below
which an individual prefers to migrate illegally than not to migrate:
I =
dwf   pI
wh
(62)
After aggregating over the distribution of skills, we obtain the demand
for illegal migration as a function of migration price pI :
DI(pI) =
Z I

f()d = F (I) (63)
As I decreases with pI and wh and increases with d and wf , it is easy to
show that, once again, the demand for illegal migration is higher the lower
the migration price, pI , and the higher the di¤erence between the income
earned as an illegal migrant, dwf , and the income in the home country, wh.
We next study what happens if the government enters the migration
market by selling visas. We consider the case where wages of legal migrants
are independent of their skills. This is for example the case of migrants
hosted by destination countries to work on specic work contracts in sector
where there is a shortage of low skilled labour, such as immigrants working in
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agriculture in California. If the government sells visas at price pL, migration
candidates prefer to migrate legally rather than illegally as long as wf pL 
dwf  pI . If the government wants to eradicate smugglers through a pricing
policy it has to sell visas at the price
pL = c+ (1  d)wf : (64)
As in the case of positive selection, the only way to eliminate the smugglers
through a "pure" sale of visas is to push their reaction price below their mar-
ginal costs. With such a pricing strategy the marginal migrant, indi¤erent
between migrating legally and staying at home, is such that:
L =
wf   pL
wh
: (65)
Replacing pL by its value from (64) yields L = dwf c
wh
, which is the threshold
in (62) evaluated at pI = c. In other words, a policy that reduces the number
of illegal migrants to zero through the sale of visas yields the same level of
migration as under perfect competition among smugglers. Therefore Propo-
sition 1 holds true under negative selection. It is also easy to show that the
main message of proposition 2 still holds, such that whenever the government
enters the market by selling visas, migration demand increases. One di¤er-
ence, however, is that selling visas leads, in this case, to an improvement of
the skill composition of migrants since L > I.
Since the average skill of migrants increases (respectively, decreases) fol-
lowing the policy when the self-selection of workers through illegal migration
is negative (positive), we have also shown that the policy increases the skills
diversity of migrants in all cases.
Studying L = dwf c
wh
, it is easy to show that, as in the case of posi-
tive selection, the only way a government can control migration following a
legalisation policy through the sale of visas is to increase repression. This
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reinforces our main message showing that policy makers must combine strict
repression with sale of visas if the aim is to both legalise migration and
control migration demand.
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Tables in Appendix
Table J1: Policy implications for N=3 when risk q varies for di¤erent degrees of risk aversion a.
a 0.000002 0.000008 0.000015 0.000035
q 0.58 0.6 0.62 0.48 0.5 0.52 0.38 0.4 0.42 0.18 0.2 0.22
pL
ra
33361 35069 36961 27621 28819 30127 23429 24319 25280 17650 18211 18810
D 0.30 0.32 0.35 0.26 0.29 0.31 0.23 0.26 0.28 0.18 0.20 0.23
c 2.68 2.50 2.32 2.66 2.50 2.34 2.65 2.50 2.35 2.68 2.50 2.33
 -0.48 -0.47 -0.46 -0.50 -0.49 -0.48 -0.51 -0.50 -0.49 -0.52 -0.51 -0.51
Note: prices pL
ra
are in USD
Table J2: Policy implications for N=5 when risk q varies for di¤erent degrees of risk aversion a.
a 0.0000005 0.000005 0.000026
q 0.44 0.46 0.48 0.38 0.4 0.42 0.18 0.2 0.22
pL
ra
24749 25670 26663 22658 23446 24291 17414 17932 18481
D 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.15 0.16 0.17
c 2.63 2.50 2.37 2.63 2.50 2.37 2.64 2.50 2.36
 -0.46 -0.45 -0.44 -0.48 -0.47 -0.47 -0.50 -0.49 -0.49
Note: prices pL
ra
are in USD
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Figure 1: Pricing scheme of the smugglers pI(pL) in the uniform example
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